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Abstract· 
This dissertation is motivated by the desire to understand the origin of inter-
group hostility. One issue that divided many Americans in the 1990s is the 
issue of immigration. Starting with Proposition 187 in California, a wave of 
nativism has raised the concern that diversity leads to polarization in this 
society. 
Drawing from theories of inter-group relations, I examine how Americans 
perceive new immigrants and form preferences on immigration policies. I use 
empirical data analysis to test whether it was interest conflict and/ or personal 
prejudice that motivated a wave of legislation for decreased immigration and 
restrictions on social welfare payments to immigrants. 
With careful differentiation of issues and individuals, I show that most 
Americans use personal prejudice, such as racial stereotypes or egalitarian 
beliefs, to form perceptions on immigrants, independent of their views on 
current economic conditions. Due to the opposite effects exerted by personal 
prejudice against racial minorities and traditional values of egalitarianism, 
most Americans are facing a dilemma in their attitudes toward immigrants. 
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Yet, attitudes do not translate directly to policy preferences. When pre-
sented with the choices on public policies, most Americans reveal the rational 
side of opinion formation. The referents of economic performance or personal 
economic well being had significant influences on policy preferences. For racial 
minorities, they even set aside personal sentiment in order to· achieve strategic 
and long-term interests. 
The extensive data analysis in this dissertation is designed to achieve a 
more important goal. As the controversy between the theory of realistic con-
flict and the theory of prejudice grows with each new study, I challenge both 
theories' assumptions of ubiquity. With survey data complimenting aggre-
gate data, and national, state, and local data cross-validating each other, I 
show that the very perception of realistic conflict bear the imprint of personal 
prejudice. 
Substantively, this work contributes to the understanding of nativism in 
the 1990s. It shows that desegregation and economic progress by minority 
groups can help bridge gaps in this society. Theoretically, I demonstrate that 
the logic of opinion formation is contingent upon the content, context and 
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Chapter 1 
INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTIONS ON 
INTER-GROUP RELATIONS 
The twentieth century, though marked by unprecedented leaps in modernizing 
technologies, still has not come to fully understand inter-group relations. The 
last decade of the century has witnessed brutal ethnic wars in the Balkan 
Peninsula and on the African continent, pursuit of secession in Quebec and 
Chechnya, and attempted social exclusion of new immigrants in Europe and 
North America, just to name a few examples. Within the United States, race 
rivals any political issue to stay at'the top of the political agenda. In recent 
years, incidences of racial friction have never stopped surfacing. In 1992, the 
Rodney King case verdict set off a riot in Los Angeles. In 1994, different 
racial groups split over the rights of illegal immigrants. In 1997, California 
ended affirmative action as state programs, a long time policy designed to 
facilitate the progress of minorities and women. The President is making 
dialogue between different racial groups his top priority. 
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This dissertation aims to explore the origins of hostility and alienation in 
inter-group relations. Among the many puzzles that constitute the nature 
of inter-group relations, the following questions motivate my research: Are 
inter-group hostilities fueled by competition for material gains or emotional 
sentiments? If both factors matter, is it plausible that some issues prompt for 
individuals material calculations while others trigger her solidary sentiments? 
I use the case of nativism in 1990's to explore the answers to these questions. 
1.1 Scope: A Study of Public Opinion 
INDIVIDUAL VS. GROUP LEVEL APPROACH 
This research approaches these questions at the micro-level. The theories 
and empirical analysis involved both aim only to reveal the rules of individ-
ual behavior. The alternative approach, obviously, is to describe and measure 
macro-level phenomenon. The so-called macro-level approach on this topic 
means taking groups as units of analysis, as opposed to the micro-level that 
takes individuals as the units of analysis. Typical macro-level research stud-
ies degrees of segregation (often measured by GINI coefficients), leadership 
and organization within groups, and other relevant variables that are only 
measurable at the group level.1 
1 For a classic study, see E. Franklin Frazier, Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern 
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I opt for the micro-level approach for two reasons. First, the "preferences" 
of a group reflects the aggregated preferences of its members. If we assume that 
group behavior is guided by group preferences, "one must always make some 
assumptions about individual motivation in order to develop a meaningful 
theory appropriate to groups as units of analysis" (Blalock 1967). So starting 
from individual preference avoids making these assumptions. Further, the ag-
gregation process itself is also the product of individual preferences. According 
to Riker's (1980) "inheritability" argument, any institution that processes de-
cision making for a collectivity is the product of individual preferences. Most 
variables that macro-level studies rely upon are about the institutional estab-
lishment within a group, such as organizational structure and leadership. In 
this sense, they are indirect measures of individual preference. Thus, rigorous 
analysis on the micro-level is essential to understanding group behavior." 
PSYCHOLOGY VS. POLITICS 
Though this is a study of individual political behavior, it is not a psycholog-
ical analysis of various types of individuals. The research does not examine the 
causes of individual differences. Rather, it focuses on the factors that are most 
invariant across individuals in driving them to behave positively/negatively to-
ward people of other groups. There is no doubt that different psychological 
World, New York: Knopf, 1957. 
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conditions result in different degree of reception to various forces, such as eco-
nomic distress or social norms. In fact, social psychologists have pioneered the 
study of prejudice and established the relationship between personalities and 
attitude (Allport, 1935). However, this research is interested in the political 
aspect of conflict analysis, and distinguishes itself from the traditional work 
by social psychologists in the field for two reasons. 
First, the findings in this dissertation are about fundamental problems of 
contemporary politics in the United States, namely what the public thinks of 
immigration reform in the 1990's. I do not attempt to reveal the universal truth 
of human behavior, as many psychological studies aim to. Though "[p]erhaps 
it is true that the only universal propositions in social science are in fact 
psychological," 2 the question is whether these completely general propositions 
are really essenti_al for explaining political opinion. Blalock (1967) pointed out 
that "these general psychological theories are contentless in the sense that the 
nature of rewards, goals, and activities is not specified. This is, of course, what 
makes them so general." Psychological theories may be helpful in pointing out 
neglected variables in political studies, but cannot substitute for them. This 
research involves political issues with specific outcomes, and will model public 
opinion on these issues concretely. 
2See George Homans, "Contemporary Theory in Sociology," in R. E. L. Faris ed. Hand-
book of Modern Sociology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964, Chapter 25. 
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Second, a political approach focuses on exploring those motivations that 
apply to most of the general public. In contrast, psychological analysis is more 
interested in finding out the causes of individual attitudinal differences. Since 
group conflict often takes place when a significant number of the people in 
one group share similar negative views of the other group, this analysis should 
position its focal point on public opinion, not individual opinions. For exam-
. ple, if a politician wants to advocate secession, she would use some cause that 
attracts most followers, such as improving living standards. With a reason-
able assumption that there is no concentration of people with some particular 
personality, such as authoritarianism, it would be unwise of her to advocate 
an authoritarianism-oriented platform instead. 
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation 
Two schools of thought have dominated the study of public opinion on group 
. conflict. One school of thought attributes the source of conflict to a rational 
calculation of self-interest, often in the form of competition among groups for 
social and economic resources. The other school of thought stresses ideological 
factors as the motives for intolerance and hostility. The debate between these 
two schools of thought is a vivid example of the century-old controversy over 
the relative merits of economic theories of social causation and theories stress-
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ing ideological factors such as belief systems or mental outlooks. Though each 
school is well supported by theorists and empiricists in the literature, no one 
seems to be able to tell why sometimes the other theory is more persuasive. 
In Chapter 2 I conduct a comprehensive literature review to summarize the 
works on the two theories and provide my critiques. 
Starting in Chapter 3 I analyze the recurrence of nativism in the 1990's. 
Since Proposition 187 symbolized this wave of nativism, I first show how Cal-
ifornia voters split on their support for the Proposition. Chapter 4 continues 
the inquiry by studying voting records. As a form of aggregate data, voting 
records have not been properly studied due to methodological difficulties. In 
this work, I apply a new method called the generalized method of bounds 
to show how we can reconstruct important information from aggregate data. 
Chapter 4's focus is how regional characteristics can influence the vote choice 
on Proposition 187. 
In Chapter 5 I. expand the focus to study a national survey on opinion 
toward immigration. Since Proposition 187 was able to stir up a wave of reform 
on immigration law, nativism sentiment was certainly present throughout the 
country. Based upon the findings in the previous chapters, I analyze how 
traditional beliefs influence the contemporary views of the "American Dream." 
Chapter 6 zooms back to Los Angeles, California, to study urbanites opin-
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ion. Since most of the immigrants are urban-bound and that urban population 
has a high degree of racial diversity, I study whether urban opinion has any 
special characteristics. 
In conclusion I d~velop a theoretical framework on public opinion forma-
tion. i argue that even if it is about one issue, such as immigration, public 
opinion is often formed with different concerns. The assumption that either 
the theory of realistic conflict or the theory of prejudice has omnipotent ex-
planatory power need not be true. Different consequences and different social 
context can bring different logic of reasoning. In addition, the two theories can 
actually compliment each other to contribute to the understanding of opinon 
formation. 
1.3 Implications of Research 
Overall, this dissertation intends to· make contributions in three areas. First, it 
is an attempt to synthesize the theories behind interest politics and symbolic 
politics. By investigating the empirical evidence that individuals may make 
decisions based upon different principal factors, I find that opinion formation 
should be differentiated by context and consequences. Motives behind opin-
ions about attitudes need not be the same as the motives behind opinion for 
policy recommendations, even on the same general issue. By synthesizing the 
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two theories, however, we can start to understand why the two theories are 
compliments, not rivals, of each other. 
Second, it makes an addition to the substantive literature on nativism and 
California politics. It demonstrates a dilemma that most Americans face on 
immigration issues, namely, the opposite influences of racial prejudice and 
egalitarianism. The balance between the two can be easily swayed by political 
campaigns. 
And last, this research utilizes survey data at the individual level and 
voting records aggregated at the precinct level to cross-validate the findings. 
Voting records provide valuable information on sensitive issues, where survey 
returns could be influenced by the sense of political correctness. With the 
latest breakthrough in methodology, I use aggregate data to show the contex-
tual effects by regional characteristics, which are especially important in cases 
involving group proximity. 
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Chapter 2 
INTEREST. CONFLICT AND SYMBOLIC 
PREJUDICE 
Since inquiry as to the nature of political man started, people have noted 
the remarkable explanatory power of self-interest. As we know, modern demo-
cratic society is founded on the assumption that people primarily pursue their 
personal material interest. Hobbes, for example, assumed that men are by 
nature competitive egoists and argued that in a world of scarce resources, 
civil peace and political freedom are incompatible (Citrin and Green 1990). 
Hume put it more straightforwardly:"Avarice, or the desire for gain, is a uni-
versal passion which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all persons" 
(Hirschman 1977, 54). Acknowledging self-interest as a source of motivation, 
many scholars have explained inter-group relations as a result of groups' in-
terest maximization. 
Others have proposed a theory that attributes inter-group attitudes to an 
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emotional "like" or "dislike" of each other. Such emotional prejudice against a 
group is a totally subjective predisposition, which is not derived from material 
benefit or cost between the groups. This school of thought is best known for 
its role in explaining racial conflict in the United States. Sears and Kinder 
(1971) first named it the theory of "symbolic racism," and others have also 
called it "modern racism" (McConahay et al. 1981). This theory posits that 
much of the racial hostility is due to personal prejudice, independent of interest 
calculation. 
Both schools of thought have generated large amounts of work, especially 
on contemporary race relations. In the following sections, I present both theo-
ries in detail and summarize the critiques they have leveled against each other. 
2.1 Realistic Group Conflict 
Economic competition between groups was often found to be highly corre-
lated with negative attitudes between members of different groups. A study 
by Noel and Pinkly (1964) demonstrated that for both white.s and blacks, 
"the greater the probability of outgroup economic competition, the greater 
the probability of outgroup prejudice" (p. 621). Their data indicated that 
lower-class whites were more prone to anti-black prejudice than upper-class 
whites. Among blacks, the most anti-white prejudices were found in the low 
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and the upper income levels, while the least prejudice among the middle class. 
Allport gave a typical case of economic competition correlating with ethnic 
confilct in New English mill towns. When mills needed cheap labor, they sent 
their agents to Southern Europe to arrange for large-scale immigration to sup-
ply their needs. "When the Italians and Greeks arrived they were not made 
welcome by the established Yankees in the region, for they did, in fact, tem-
porarily debase the labor market, reduce income, and increase unemployment 
among former workers. Especially in slack seasons or in times of economic 
depression, the sense of competition was keen" (1954, 229). 
Such cases relating self-interest to inter-group relations are many. Comp-
bell and Le Vine (1965) generalized from the results of their studies and called 
their approach realistic group conflict theory. Realistic group conflict theory 
assumes that group conflicts are rational in the sense that groups do have 
incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources. This theory 
has since been widely used to explain conflicts between groups. For exam-
ple, almost all studies on racial conflict in the U.S. have tested the hypothesis 
that racial conflict originated in a clash of group interest. Case studies on 
the racially divisive opinions on busing, affirmative action, and electoral can-
didates have often concluded that the competitive aspects of group relations 
were the cause of conflict (Bobo 1983; Caditz 1976; Cummings 1980; Giles and 
Evans 1984; Smith 1981; Wellman 1977). As Allport put it, "Realistic conflict 
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is like a note on an organ. It sets all prejudices that are attuned to it into 
simultaneous vibration" (1954, 233). 
Realistic conflicts derive from incompatible - though not necessarily ir-
reconcilable - group interests. Fireman and Gamson (1979) defined group 
interest as "an objective interest in a collective good to the extent that· the 
good promotes the long-run wealth and power of the group and the viability 
of its design for living" (p. 24). Two aspects are made clear in this definition. 
First, group interest is an objective collective good, which may not coincide 
with private goods. Second, "wealth and power" of the group can measure the 
advancement of group interest. 
SELF-INTEREST VS. GROUP INTEREST 
Conventional forms of group interest theory are quite similar to self-interest 
theories, in that group interest can be simply the aggregation of self-interest 
of all group memb.ers. Here self-interest is narrowly defined as "tangible losses 
or gains to an individual or his or her immediate family" (Bobo and Kluegel 
1993). In the case of ethnic tensions in New England mill towns mentioned 
above, we see a good example' of how similar personal interest within each 
ethnic group converged to a group interest and shaped ethnic relations. Other 
research has produced similar findings. For example, scholars have found con-
sistent though moderate negative correlation between income level and sup-
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port for welfare spending (Gilliam and Whitby 1989; Shapiro and Young 1988). 
Obviously, similar personal financial conditions result in a common interest in 
paying less taxes. 
However, self-int~rest sometimes may not be the group interest. Sometimes 
we are able to observe that a group-level common objective is sought after even 
though it may not be beneficial to some of its members. Unlike the type of 
group interest that coincides with each group member's personal interest, this 
kind of group interest would not have existed if individuals had no sense of 
shared fate with others. For example, it is a well-known fact that blacks 
are consistently more supportive of race-targeted policies and welfare policies 
than are whites of comparable socioeconomic status (Bobo 1991; Gilliam and 
Whitby 1989; Klugel and Smith 1983). Presumably, the fact that blacks are 
more likely to support the policies arises from their belief that these policies 
would promote the welfare of other members of the black community. And 
they take· perso.nal satisfaction in seeing such group-level improvements. 
Embedded in the phenomenon of thinking in terms of group-level interest 
is the concept of group consciousness. Identification with a group and a sense 
of shared fate lead to group-based assessments of self-interest. In other words, 
when a person identifies with a group, she "internalizes" the welfare of other 
group members as her own. So a strong sense of group identity should lead to 
a higher level of internalizing group members' interests as self-interest. Some 
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scholars have further explored the correlation between the sense of group iden-
tification and the person's socioeconomic characteristics (Gurin, Hatchett, and 
Jackson 1989; Jackman and Jackman 1983). Factors such as income, education 
and occupation greatly influence the perception of group interest. 
The "group interest" used in this thesis considers group interest of both 
kinds discussed above. The first is the simple aggregation of individual group 
members' self-interests. This group of interest comes to being when a signifi-
cant number of the group members share the same kind of self-interest. The 
second kind of group interest means a consensus interest that needs not to 
be most of its members' self-interest. It could be of direct beneficial to only 
certain types of the group's members, but most of other members internalize 
it and render it a group's interest. 
REALISTIC CONFLICT VS. N ONREALISTIC CONFLICT 
Realistic group conflict is distinguished from "nonrealistic" conflict in that 
it focuses on how groups seek to achieve concrete outcomes (Coser 1956). It 
is goal-oriented, whereas nonrealistic conflict involves a nonspecific release of 
hostility or aggressive psychological impulses. Where dispute is focused on a 
delimited issue or issues concerned with the distribution of power, wealth, or 
status between groups, and involves clearly defined groups with differing ob-
jectives, there is realistic conflict. Disputes lacking these features, especially 
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those lacking a concern with the rival objectives of the conflicting groups, are 
"nonrealistic. Although cognitive processes and inter-group affective orienta-
tions enter into both types of conflict, nonrealistic conflict is largely reducible 
tO non-rational psychological impulses (Bobo 1988, 91-92). 
Of course, "realistic" is what one perceives as realistic. In what Giles and 
Evans called "power theory," which they argue to explain racial relations in 
the U.S., the origin of anti-black attitudes was attributed to the perceived 
threat to whites' social status. Power theory conceptualizes racial conflict 
"not as vestiges of pre-modern society but rather as vehicles for the pursuit 
of interest in modern pluralist societies." (Giles and Evans 1986). In essence, 
power theory is a version of realistic group conflict theory that considers the 
gain of social status and political influences as group interest. It points out 
whites' profound interest in maintaining themselves as a politically powerful 
and economically advanced group. Assuming a "zero-sum" condition in social 
mobility, they want to prevent blacks from being empowered politically and 
economically, which they believe would only result in the demotion of whites' 
status. 
Although such perceived conflict in interests may not be "real" in the sense 
that blacks' increasing social status does not necessarily result in whites' falling 
behind, it is considered "realistic" conflict. It involves clearly defined groups, 
white and blacks, in competition, and the goal is to secure the dominant 
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position in the society in terms of political power, economic wealth, and social 
status. Though we cannot rule out a psychological basis for feelings of threat, 
the extent to which such conflicts are "realistic" is often studied empirically. 
A handful of empirical studies have sought to explain the "realistiG" aspect 
of perceived threat. Drawing on in-depth interviews with several prototypical 
respondents from a survey of San Francisco Bay area residents, Wellman (1977) 
found that whites frequently objected to large-scale change in racial compo-
sition in the population. These objections, he concluded, were not grounded 
in a form of prejudice but appeared to serve as a defense of group privilege. 
Smith's analysis (1981) of national survey data for the period of 1954-1978 
showed that whites' willingness to send their children to integrated schools var-
ied substantially with the number of blacks involved. He found that "whites 
of all regional, . cohort, and educational attainment groups share a common 
self-interest in their unwillingness to accept minority dominance" (1977, 569). 
Bobo (1983) found that whites' opposition to busing was determined by their 
attitudes toward the black political movement. Such an effect was interpreted 
as evidence of group conflict because attitudes toward black activists involved 
a sense of political threat. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) found that 
blacks and Jews tended to feel threatened by right-wing extremist groups such 
as the Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazi organizations. Shamir and Sullivan (1983) 
provided cross-national data for the U.S. and Israel that also indicates that 
17 
expressions of perceived threat are based more in real-world politics than in 
psychological insecurity or projection. 
So far I have discussed the two major characteristics of realistic group con-
flict theory: group interest and realistic conflict. The application of this theory 
is widely found in the literature on contemporary racial attitudes as I will dis-
cuss in a number of cases later. Overall, realistic group conflict theory explains 
group conflict by first hypothesizing group interests, relative group standing, 
and perceived threats or challenges to group interests. These hypotheses are 
then tested with empirical evidence. In most of the research, realistic group 
conflict is considered as one of the hypotheses. It was often rejected, how-
ever, when researchers were trying to explain the "new" racial attitudes in the 
United States since the 1960's. Among the alternative explanations, the the-
ory of symbolic prejudice has risen as a major rival to realistic group conflict 
theory. 
2.2 The Theory of Symbolic Prejudice 
With the landmark 1960's civil rights laws, the principle of racial equality 
has been enshrined as the law of the land in the United States (McAdam 
1982; Stitkoff 1981). Yet, ever since the late 1960's, the civil rights movement 
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has struggled with various procedural means designed to realize the principle 
of racial equality. The implementation of civil rights laws, such as busing, 
affirmative action, minority set-aside programs, and open-housing laws, have 
generated racially divisive reactions. National polls have shown overwhelming 
rejections of all the procedural policies, despite strong support for the principle 
of racial equality (Carmines and Champagne Jr. 1990). Such changes of 
content in race relations signaled a need to modify traditional studies that were 
relatively inefficient in explaining the new phenomenon. Symbolic racism has 
since emerged as an innovative approach to explain the gap between principle 
and implementation. 
First used to explain white opposition to a black liberal challenger, Tom 
Bradley, in the 1969 Los Angeles mayoralty election by Sears and Kinder 
(1971), the symbolic racism approach tries to account for white resistance to 
black empowerment with a form of new racial prejudice which consists of: 
· a blend of aritiblack affect and the kind of traditional American val-
ues embodied in the Protestant Ethic. Symbolic racism represents 
a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on 
moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values 
as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and 
discipline (Kinder and Sears 1981, 416). 
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In other words, as an attitudinal construct, symbolic racism can be better 
understood as having two aspects. First, in terms of theoretical development, 
symbolic racism has its roots in traditional theory of prejudice. It reflects as 
an emotional hostility, as opposed to calculated rejection. Second, in terms 
of me~surement, symbolic racism is a "joint function. of two separate factors: 
antiblack affect and traditional values" (Sears 1988, 56). In other words, sym-
bolic racism comes to being when "negative feelings toward blacks merges with 
other basic values to form psychological resistance to contemporary proposals 
beneficial to blacks as a group" (Bobo 1988, 103). 
THEORETICAL ISSUES OF SYMBOLIC RACISM 
Symbolic racism is a theory of prejudice. Earlier studies on prejudice 
have often focused on factors that vary by each individual, such as person-
alities, childhood experiences, and so on. Gradually, prejudice has been used 
to explain inter:-group relations, though with various definitions. It has been 
"thought of as irrationally based, negative attitudes against certain ethnic 
groups and their members" (Pettigrew 1982, 28), or as "an emotional, rigid 
attitude ... toward a group of people" (Simpson and Yinger 1972, 24). In 
general, prejudice can be understood as an emotional antipathy based on an 
inaccurate and rigidly held stereotype (Allport 1954). The antiblack affect in 
symbolic racism relates closely to prejudice and stereotype. Kinder and Sears 
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(1981, 416) explicitly argued that symbolic prejudice is a variant of prejudice. 
McConahay et al. (1981, 577) contended that their "modern" or symbolic 
racism scale definitely measured an aspect of prejudice. 
It is worth noting that the notion of symbolic racism was originally gener-
ated inductively from survey responses. In 1971, Pettigrew designed and con-
ducted a survey to study white electoral responses to black mayoral candidates 
(Pettigrew 1971). Based on this survey and a couple of follow-ups, Kinder and 
Sears induced the concept of symbolic racism with responses "that had been 
developed by other researchers for other purposes" (Sears 1988, 56). In later 
studies, additional variables were generated to measure the symbolic racism 
concept more precisely. Over time, most proponents of symbolic racism have 
utilized variables in two categories. The first is "antagonism toward blacks' 
'pushing too hard' and 'moving too fast"' (Sears 1988, 56). And the second 
is "resentment toward special favors for blacks, such as in 'reverse discrimi-
nation,' racial quotas in jobs or education, excessive ·access to welfare, special 
treatment by government, or unfair and excessive economic gain by blacks" 
(Sears 1988, 56). 
Symbolic racism has been a powerful explanation of contemporary race 
relations. It is found in white resistance to busing, affirmative action programs, 
and black candidates for political offices. It is exhibited in white opposition 
to virtually all procedural race issues, even in instances when whites are not 
21 
affected directly by procedural civil rights policies. For example, whites oppose 
busing even when their children are not threatened directly by busing orders. 
It is thus suggested that white resistance to racial change arises out of what 
these policies evoke symbolically and emotionally for whites. 
Furthermore, symbolic racism has manifested itself on issues not directly 
related to race, such as tax reduction, as proposed in the famous Proposition 
13 in California in 1978. Sears and Citrin (1982) showed that symbolic racism 
was the most important factor in white support for Proposition 13, even more 
than party identification and political ideology. Even when the preferences 
on government size, attitudes on government spending and government waste 
were controlled for, symbolic racism still had the largest impact of all variables. 
Thus, the authors concluded that symbolic racism should be an important 
dimension in public opinion. 
Yet symbolic racism is not without critics, both on conceptualization and 
measurement. Bobo (1988) pointed out that white racial attitudes have long 
involved negative affect toward blacks and a belief that blacks lack certain 
positively valued traits to be found in whites, such as most of the qualities 
associated with the Protestant ethic. Though symbolic racism claims to be 
different from the old racism in that it replaces the open bigotry with value-
based resentment, the latter is not a new component of racial attitudes. Beliefs 
and values were long associated with the justification of slavery and old racism. 
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Tataki provided a vivid example of how Thomas Jefferson used "republi-
can values" to justify white privilege. Jefferson argued that the United States 
should be a fundamentally new nation based on republican values, which in-
cluded virtues like self-reliance, industriousness, and moral restraint. These 
qualities were viewed as more associated with whites than with blacks (Takaki 
1979, 64). Thus, despite his moral discomfort with slavery, Jefferson defended 
the institution of slavery which in his view was most conducive to the main-
tenance of virtue. Like many other southern whites, according to Shalhope, 
"Jefferson clung to an ideology-to a way of life with identity and meaning in 
a changing world-which rested on slavery. The exploitation of the black was 
legitimized in terms of preserving higher value a republican society" (1976, 
556). 
Many researchers have also pointed to whites' sense of themselves as a 
group endowed with valued traits that were absent in other racial groups. As 
Takaki (1979) argued, since the establishment of America as a nation, whites 
have differentiated themselves from other race or ethnic groups with the values 
and beliefs they hold. These values have become a kind of id~ology for the 
dominant group in the society, and have accompanied the pursuit of various 
group interest ends, such as the taking of the Native American's lands, the 
enslavement of blacks, discrimination against Asian laborers, and so on. In 
short, critics of symbolic racism remind us that traditional values have always 
23 
been associated with whites' sense of superiority. To say that they are the 
sources of a modern form of racism implicitly denies their historical presence. 
In short, the theoretical aspect of symbolic racism attracts lots of debate 
on whether it is different from old racism at all. Proponents of the theory 
argue that it is, because whites at least use values or virtues to justify the 
social gap between whites and blacks. The old racism needed no justification 
at all, deeming whites as .superior to all other races. Opponents of the theory 
argue that the justification was done in the past as well, at least by the elite. 
The real-world politics seems to suggest that racism after 1960s has taken 
a different form than racism before. First, from the reality of the society, we 
know that the principle of racial equality is well accepted by most Americans. 
Second, even if the elite had sought to justify racism in the past, it is differ-
ent when the general public thinks that racism can be justified by virtues or 
defects. For the purpose of this study, I am more concerned with the measure-
ment problems of symbolic racism. 
MEASUREMENT ISSUES OF SYMBOLIC RACISM 
The theory of symbolic racism leaves much to desire in its empirical anal-
ysis. Though its measurement is seen to be a joint function of antiblack affect 
and traditional values, it has not done a good job of measuring either. First, 
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let us take a look at the typical survey questions measuring symbolic racism 
in the literature as summarized by Sear (1988). 
• Antagonism toward blacks' demands 
1. Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rig~ts. 
(Agree) 
2. Blacks shouldn't push themselves where they're not wanted. (Agree) 
3. Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too 
fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. (Trying to push 
too fast) 
4. It is easy to understand the anger of black people in America. (Dis-
agree) 
• Resentment about special favors for blacks 
1. Over the past few years, the government and news media have 
shown more· respect to blacks then they deserve. (Agree) 
2. Over the past few years, blacks have got more economically than 
they deserve. (Agree) 
3. The government should not make any special effort to help blacks 
and other racial minorities because they should help themselves.(Agree) 
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4. Do you think blacks who receive money from welfare programs could 
get along without if they tried, or do they really need the help? 
(Could get along) 
5. Do you think Los Angeles city officials pay more, less, or the same 
attention to a request or complaint from a black person as from a 
white person? (More) 
• Denial of continuing discrimination 
1. How many black people in Louisville and Jefferson County do you 
think miss out on jobs or promotions because of racial discrimina-
tion? (None) 
2. Blacks have it better than they ever had it before. (Agree) 
(Sears 1988, 57) 
Obviously, these survey questions capture people's opposition to procedu-
ral civil rights legislation. But have these responses revealed anything that 
is irrational, or any reasoning related to deeming blacks lacking American 
traditional values? Not quite. Most of these survey questions concern contem-
porary racial problems, such as the influence of black political activism and the 
civil rights movement. As Bobo (1983) pointed out, these questions seem not 
to measure emotional or stereotyped orientation toward blacks, but rather are 
relevant to real-world politics. When questions explicitly invoke concern about 
26 
real-world political actors and events, and tap a dominant group's sense of po-
litical threat from a contentious subordinate group, they may be measuring a 
sense of group competition as well as a kind of affect. 
The fact th~t symbolic racism studies have been able to show the close 
correlation between whites' resentment toward blacks' "pushiness" leads to 
another kind of interpretation. From the same kind of data analysis, some 
researchers have argued that what whites perceived as "pushiness" indicates 
black activists' struggle over redistributing social resources and political power 
(Bobo 1988). Compared with before, the civil rights movement has brought 
more than ever a sense of group interest into current race relations. To many 
whites, what is at stake is no longer just sharing bus seats or drinking fountains 
with blacks, but more substantial resources such as higher education, employ-
ment opportunities, political offices, and so on. Thus, unlike old racism, the 
current racial resentment seems to involve more group interest than prejudice. 
In other words, the survey questions that most symbolic racism studies have 
used only tap the surface. Since they often use the answers to these questions 
to explain public opinion on certain candidates or policies, they go no deeper 
into the questions which they believe to be exogenous variables in their case 
studies. As Sniderman and Tetlock asked, "the symbolic racism approach begs 
the question - how, after all, is one to tell whether opposition to affirmative 
action is racist or not" (1986, 146). Put differently, Sniderman and Tetlock 
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question the causal relationship between symbolic racism and public opinion 
on policies. 
This study will go to each component of symbolic racism to expose its 
explanatory power. Both racial stereotype and traditional values will be built 
in the model as the themy originally proposed - an additive function of both. 
In addition, this dissertation only uses the logic of the theory of symbolic 
prejudice, not its content. What I am interested in finding out is simply the 
relevance of racial stereotypes and traditional values in explaining nativism. 
THEORIES OF CONTEMPORARY RACE RELATIONS IN THE U.S. 
The literature on inter-group politics is replete with works claiming to prove 
or to disprove either the theory of realistic group conflict or the theory of sym-
bolic prejudice. Almost every study provides assessments from empirical data 
analysis, on topics ranging from race/ethnicity relations, gender gaps, conflict 
between new immigrants and older residents, different linguistic groups, and 
so bn. Since it is not possible to review all of them, let me present some major 
works on several issues. 
I. BUSING 
As one of the procedural civil rights policies, several judges implemented 
"forced busing" in the 1960's. Busing was designed to send children to schools 
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other than their neighborhood schools so that black children living in black 
neighborhoods could have the opportunity of attending schools in white neigh-
borhoods. This is simply a way to help black children to get a better education. 
This attempt of racial integration at school was fiercely opposed by whites. 
From Boston to Los Angeles, white suburbanites fought the policy in court 
and formed organizations to protest. 
Dozens of studies on the public opinion of busing have revealed compelling 
evidence that symbolic racism was the major cause of the opposition (Kinder 
and Sears 1981; McClendon 1985; McClendon and Pestello 1983; McConahay 
1982; Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980). 
The irrelevance of personal interest was the first thing demonstrated by these 
researches. Having school age children, residing in a district threatened by a 
busing plan, or actually having one's child forcibly bused made no difference 
on an individual's attitude toward the policy. There was a uniform hostility 
toward forced busing. 
Meanwhile, measures of anti-black affect effectively predicted the attitude 
on busing. A typical example is Sears et al. (1979), where symbolic racism 
was an additive scale composed of answers to eight questions: support for 
segregation, fair housing, blacks' intelligence, fair employment opportunity, 
access to hotels and restaurants, if civil rights movement have pushed too fast, 
if civil rights movement have helped or hurt blacks' cause, and if civil rights 
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movement has been violent or peaceful. Sears et al. found that, together with 
self-identification of being liberal or conservative, symbolic racism accounted 
well for opposition to busing. They concluded that "[i]t is apparently the 
symbolism evoked by the prospect of any white children's forced intimate con-
tact with blacks, rather than the reality of one's own children's contact, that 
triggers opposition to busing" (1979, 382). 
Bobo (1983) challenges this interpretation. He argues that when concerns 
are extrapolated from one's own to any white child's welfare, it is not symbol-
ism that is involved, but group consciousness. In addition, though immediate 
threat was found to have no effect on differentiating the opinion, there could be 
a sense of long-term perceived threat. At least, symbolic racism is not the only 
factor causing white opposition to busing. Demands and protests by blacks 
on behalf of their own group's interest could have triggered a realistic sense of 
threat among whites regarding their own group's interests and privileges. And 
this sense of threat was reflected in whites' group-wide uniform resistance to 
the change of racial status quo. 
In rebuttal, Sears and Kinder (1985) pointed out that there was no direct 
evidence showing that whites perceived busing as a realistic threat. Neither 
did they view themselves as sharing a common destiny. In any case self-interest 
was a component of the majority group interest and was direct and tangible. 
Yet, there was remarkably little evidence of it. Further, they argued that group 
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consciousness was cognitive and could be understood as an affect toward the 
group. 
This debate between Sears and his co-authors and Bobo attracted many 
researchers to the topic of whites' opinion on busing. Generally, the effect of 
symbolic racism was found to have gone beyond and could predict well· the 
electoral outcome of pro-busing school board members, minority candidates, 
and even ballot measures. 
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The research findings in this domain parallel those reported above for the 
busing issue. Compared with blacks, whites have consistently opposed the im-
plementation of affirmative action programs in hiring and admission. Among 
whites, indicators of self-interest have at best weak correlation with their atti-
tudes (Jacobson 1985; Kinder and Sanders 1986). Kinder and Sanders (1987) 
developed measur~s of .both personal interest and group interest in affirmative 
action by asking respondents whether they themselves would be affected by 
such programs and also how they felt whites as a group would be affected. 
Their results indicated that the most powerful predictor of white opposition 
to Affirmative Action was a measure of anti-black affect. 
Kluegel and Smith employed demographic variables as proxies for self- in-
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terest and also found that the "objective or direct threat posed to an individ-
ual's position of relative privilege" had a minimal impact on attitudes toward 
affirmative action programs (1983, 211). The authors argue that whites fre-
quently resisted demands for racial change because these were viewed as a 
threat to the existing stratification system which is regarded as beneficial for . . 
themselves and American society as a whole. 
So, similar to white opinion on the issue of busing, empirical studies seem 
to have found both evidence of affect-related resentment and sense of group 
interest in the opinion formation of whites on affirmative action programs. 
III. INNER CITY RACIAL/ETHNIC CONFLICT 
Racial/ethnic minorities in the U.S. often reside in major metropolitan 
cities. Consequentially, racial/ethnic conflict has been one of the political 
features of inner-city politics. New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, the three 
largest cities in the United States,· have all experienced racial/ ethnic conflicts 
as severe as riots. Most of the time, researchers have been able to identify the 
realistic interest that triggered the confrontation. 
For example, Rudwick (1964) found the fact that blacks coming into the 
big cities caused job replacement for unskilled whites could account for the 
Chicago riot of 1919, the Detroit riot of 1943, and the East St. Louis riot of 
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1917. In their study on ethnic groups in New York City, Glazer and Moynihan 
(1970) found that much of the conflict between blacks, Puerto Ricans, Jews, 
and other ethnic groups could best be understood not as racism but as a 
competition for scarce resources in the economic and social system. 
However, in electoral politics, symbolic racism overwhelms interest conflict. 
In their ground-breaking study on the 1969 mayoral election in Los Angeles 
where a black Democrat (Tom Bradley) challenged a white conservative incum-
bent (Sam Yorty), Sears and Kinder (1970, 1971) discovered that anti-black 
affect and resentment toward procedural civil rights policies best accounted for 
whites' opposition to Bradley. Their survey results showed that no sense of 
realistic or "tangible" interest conflict was associated with whites' vote choice. 
Other researchers have also reported incidents of racial/ ethnic voting.· Namely, 
support for racially/ ethnically minority candidates has been coming mostly 
from minority voters (Nelson 1979; Pamper 1966). Gordon (1967) argued that 
ethnic voting is expected if the dominant group in the society is resistant to 
the minority group's values and culture. This theory is found to be useful 
in explaining the racial tension in the 1990's Los Angeles. Studying blacks' 
attitude toward Asians and Hispanics following the 1992 riot, Cummings and 
Lambert (1997) found that much of the tension was caused by cultural and 
psychological factors instead of job competition or economic deprivation. 
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So the debate on the origin of group conflict between realistic group conflict 
and the theory of symbolic prejudice continues. In view of it, some work has 
addressed the inadequacies of single-factor theories (Blalock 1967; Castles and 
Kosack 1985; Wilson 1973), by taking a compromise position to say that both 
schools of thought are equally persuasive. But overall, the literature is filled 
with case studies content with showing that one of the two theories is effective 
in explaining some single case of inter-group politics. 
2.3 A Synthesized Approach 
A central assumption in this debate is that an individual follows one way 
of thinking or another. That is, a person always makes her decisions upon 
careful calculation of self-interest, or alternatively by following her ideological 
sentiment and predisposition. But this need not be the case. Different issue 
context or different consequences can trigger different reasoning by different 
types of individuals. In this dissertation, I use empirical analysis to show 
that we can differentiate the applicability of each theory by the content and 
consequences of the issue. There is no reason to expect that one of the theory 
should be more powerful to explain every issue. Further, the two theories 
can complement each other to better describe the dynamics of information 
processing in opinion formation. 
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In his classical study on the stability of public opinion, Converse (1964) 
found that belief systems are the source of stable opinions over time. He further 
predicted that "policy items that do bear more rather than less explicitly upon 
their fortunes should show less stability than affect towards the group qua 
group but more than those items for which contextual information is required 
(p. 240). If we consider what Converse calls "the belief system overlaps with 
what Sears calls "predisposition, then the above quote offers us a conjecture 
that the theory of prejudice be better at explaining opinions on issues that do 
not involve explicit redistribution of resources. 
Since most of the opinion studies employ survey analysis, the phrasing of 
questionnaires is central to the findings. If the survey solicits general attitude 
between racial groups, then the outcome might be better explained by the 
theory of prejuqice. If the survey solicits opinions on an explicit outcome, then 
we should expect to see less influence from prejudice, if not more from realistic 
interest calculation. So in the following chapters of case analysis, although I 
deal with public opinion on one issue, nativism, I differentiate the opinions 
into three types: general attitude, policy preferences stated in. surveys, and 
policy preferences expressed by vote in elections. Depending on the content 
and consequences, I expect the theories of interest conflict and prejudice to 
show different ability in explaining the opinions. 
Further, I claim that the two theories can work together to produce a 
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better picture of the opinion formation process. It is in the nature of inter-
group relations that there be a gap between groups, or there would not even 
be an issue of inter-group relations. The gap indicates distance. Because of 
the distance, can one identify a realistic threat from the other side? 
It is at this point that the theory of realistic group conflict and the theory 
of symbolic prejudice talk past each other. The latter has established itself by 
showing the inadequate explanatory power of interest conflict, but the former 
keeps coming back to claim other more subtle sources of self-interest unrecog-
nized by the former. Take the case of opposition to busing. Kinder and Sears 
(1981) identified three references1 as to whether the survey respondents had 
interest conflict with busing policy, and found none of them to have a signif-
icant effect in explaining the opinion on busing. But Bobo (1983) disputed 
their results, asserting that the interests they studied were only personal in-
terest, not group interest. So the critical point becomes how the perception of 
group interest is formed. 
It is at this point that I claim the two theories should complement each 
other. Personal affect toward the other group should have much to do with 
the perception of realistic interest. For example, given that two people have 
the same information on a racially sensitive issue, but one has a more negative 
affect toward the other group, she is probably more likely to see her group's 
1 See p. 29. 
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interest at stake. In other words, prejudice can make unrealistic interest real-
istic. 
In the following chapters, I use data analysis on nativism in the 1990s to 
test the applicability of each theory and conclude with a synthetic approach. 
I will first show that the recurrence of nativism in the 1990's is not a racially 
neutral issue. Then I measure the correlation between opinion types and the 
relative explanatory power of both theories. Finally I conclude how racial 
prejudice and traditional beliefs shape opinion on immigrants, and realistic 
interest calculation influences the preferences on immigration policies. 
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Chapter 3 
NATIVISM IN THE 19908: ECONOMIC 
COMPETITION OR ETHNIC PREJUDICE 
As a nation established by immigrants, the United States has traditionally 
been a generous host of immigrants from all over the world. From time to 
time, however, immigrants have faced fear and hostility - from both ordi-
nary citizens and government - especially during times of economic hardship, 
political turmoil, or war. Such cycles of nativism are well documented by 
anti-immigrant legislation and civic disorder. As early as in 1798, Congress 
passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, giving the President arbitrary powers to 
deport immigrants, particularly editors and pamphleteers, who criticized the 
U.S. government. During the depression of the 1840s, the so-called "Protes-
tant Crusade" movement popularized and led Protestant workingmen to burn 
an Irish convent in Boston and riot in several cities. In 1882, Congress passed 
the Chinese Exclusion Act, one of the first immigration laws, to keep out all 
people of Chinese origin. In 1911, the "Americanization Campaign" started, 
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aiming to change the Eastern and Southern European immigrants' cultural 
traits, civic values, and especially their language. Following the reason that 
such Americanization was ineffective to the "lower races," in 1921, Congress 
created national-original quota system for admitting immigrants. An end to 
national quotas in the 1965 Immigration Reform Act opened the United States 
to Third World peoples and brought an explosion of cultural diversity. Amer-
ican citizens who felt unsettled by such multiculturalism launched an English 
only movement in 1980s, seeking to terminate government services in other 
languages. Since early 1990's, with increasing complaints about the costs of 
today's diversity, another period of anti-immigrant activism has started. A 
popular initiative called Proposition 187 in the 1994 California election sym-
bolized this wave of new nativism. Congress followed by enacting sweeping 
legislation, toughening immigration enforcement laws and cutting government 
benefits to non-citizens. 
In this chapter, I start to explore why Proposition 187 passed with strong 
support in California in 1994. I first study how the opinion on this legislation 
was divided. Using the exit poll conducted by Los Angeles Times, I test 
whether support for this initiative could be predicted by ethnic identity or 
economic satisfaction. 
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3.1 Proposition 187 and Nativism in Califor-
• n1a 
Anti-immigrant hostility has been a recurrent theme in California history since 
the days of the Gold Rush. Since the 1850's, California has had a greater diver-
sity of humanity than anywhere else on the continent. As historians record, 
there were Chinese and "Maylays," Abyssinians, New Zealanders, "Feejee" 
sailors, Japanese, Russians, "Turks," Chileans, Peruvians, Mexicans, Ger-
mans, Italians, French, English, and Americans from every state in the union. 
Yet, such vitality was often interrupted by sudden eruptions of anti-immigrant 
violent episodes. As early as 1849, a quasi-military American force in San Fran-
cisco, called the Hounds, went after Chilean immigrants, rampaging through 
their tents and shanties one night, beating anyone who spoke Spanish. When 
the Chilean "threat" had been reduced, public hostility in San Francisco turned 
on Australians (Quinn 1997). California was also fertile ground for the Know-
Nothing crusade of the mid-1850s, an anti-Catholic movement aimed at Irish 
and German immigrants. 
Though such anti-immigrant hostility has occurred in other ports of entry 
such as New York, the way it has been expressed in Califon;1ia is different. 
Californians tend to use "civil authorities" to deal with newcomers. In last 
century, when civil society was new and weak, public fear turned into mob 
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rule and the citizen organizations. The infamous Committee of Vigilance, 
composed of businessmen, patrolled the coast and turned back undesirable 
immigrants. In this century, California citizens have used propositions and 
initiatives1 to vender their desire of restricting the rights of the newcomers. In 
1984, Californians passed the famous English as Official Language Proposition 
to eliminate bilingual ballots, which then became a stalking horse for official-
language measures in 21 other states. 
In the 1994 California general election, California again pioneered by propos-
ing and passing an immigration reform law - Proposition 187. It is a legislation 
designed to exclude illegal immigrants from accessing public social services, 
such as public health care and public education. This proposition was so piv-
otal in the election that it restored a weak incumbent governor after he took a 
strong pro- Proposition 187 stance. The proposition passed by 59% of votes. 
What Proposition 187 proposed can be summarized as follows. 2 
1 Initiative, referendum, and recall are the three forms of direct democracy. Citing Corn-
ing (1984), the initiative allows voters to propose a legislative measure or a constitutional 
amendment by filing a petition bearing a required number of valid citizen signatures. The 
referendum refers a proposed or existing law or statute to voters for their approval or re-
jection. Both the state legislatures and citizens can refer such a measure to the voters; 
and for latter a number of signatures is required. The recall allows voters to remove or 
discharge a public official from office by filing a petition bearing a specified number of valid 
signatures demanding a vote on the officials continued tenure in office. Proposition 187 was 
an initiative. 
2Proposition contains ten sections: (1) Findings and Declaration; (2) Manufacture, Dis-
tribution, or Sale of False Citizenship or Resident Alien Documents: Crime and Punishment 
(3) Use of False Citizenship or Resident Documents: Crime and Punishment; (4) Law En-
forcement Cooperation with INS; (5) Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public Social Services; 
(6) Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Publicly Funded Health Care; (7) Exclusion of Illegal 
Aliens from Public Elementary and Secondary Schools; (8) Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from 
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• It makes illegal aliens ineligible for public social services, public health 
care services (unless emergency under federal law), and public school 
education at elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels. 
• It requires various state and local agencies to report persons who are 
suspected illegal aliens to the California Attorney General and the United 
States Immigration and Naturalization Service. Mandates California 
Attorney General to transmit reports to Immigration and Naturalization 
Service and maintain records of such reports. 
• It makes it a felony to manufacture, distribute, sell or use false citizenship 
or residence documents. (1994 California Voter Information Guide) 
Reactions to this proposition were very strong and divisive. Those in favor 
of it called it the "SOS Proposition," abbreviation of ''Save Our State." They 
argued that California had been burdened with some 1.6 million of illegal im-
migrants, many of whom received welfare benefits and crowded public health 
care service and public schools. Since the number of illegal immigrants were 
increasing rapidly, the citizens of California had to "stop the incredible fl.ow of 
illegal aliens" before the state fell into "an economic and social bankruptcy" 
(1994 California Voter Information Guide). On the other hand, those who 
opposed Proposition 187 pointed out that it had no effect on deterring fu-
Postsecondary Educational Institutions; (9) Attorney General Cooperation with the INS; 
(10) Amendment and Severability. 
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ture illegal immigration because of its unfeasibility. Instead of strengthening 
the U.S. Border Patrol, it required medical workers and educators to enforce 
stricter measures of identification. Its loose statement of "suspected illegal 
alien" would only cause more trouble when such suspicion was based on the 
accent, the last names, or the shade of skin. In fact both presidents of Cal-
ifornia Teachers Association and California Medical Association were among 
those opposing it. 
But as its supporters predicted, Proposition 187 did go beyond California, 
arousing strong emotion and intense concern over immigration policies nation-
wide. Voters in several states with high concentrations of immigrants have 
tried to put similar propositions on their ballots. It was also heard on Capitol 
Hill, where the United States Congress drafted an immigration reform bill H.R. 
2202. Passed as the "Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 
1996," the bill strengthened border patrol regulation and increased penalties 
for alieri. smuggling and fraud. 3 The U.S. Congress later enacted the "Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996" and "Ille-
gal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996," which 
made substantial changes to further restrict legal immigrants from accessing 
benefits in the United States. Following H.R. 2202, the Senate introduced bill 
3H.R. 2202 includes measures on increasing border patrol and investigative person-
nel, increasing penalties for alien smuggling and for document fraud, reforming exclusion 
and deportation law and procedures, improving the verification system for eligibility for 
employment,etc. 
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S. 103 as "United States Worker Protection and Illegal Immigrant Deterrence 
Act of 1997" to provide additional measures to prevent employers from hiring 
illegal immigrants. 
However, Propos~tion 187 also faces strong challenges. Hispanic groups and 
civil rights organizations have vigorously contested its-legality. As a result, the 
U.S. District Judge Pfaelzer ruled in November 1995 that it was unconstitu-
tional to deny children of undocumented immigrants a free, public education, 
and that federally funded benefits should not be denied to immigrants re-
gardless of their status. In November 1997, Judge Pfaelzer further ruled that 
welfare legislation passed in 1996 by Congress precludes California from estab-
lishing separate laws regarding immigration policy. So what Proposition 187 
has achieved, in fact, is the 1996 immigration reform bills passed by Congress. 
They established what Proposition 187 attempted to do - tougher laws against 
illegal immigration and more restricted rights for legal immigrants. 
3.2 Public Opinion on Proposition 187 
The background of this new nativism of the 90's were historically familiar: 
economic stagnation, rising racial tensions, the dissolution of community ties, 
and widespread cynicism about the social and political institutions. Yet, the 
opinion for or against Proposition 187 did not share any common argument. 
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Those who were in favor of it emphasized its economic motivation, while those 
who objected it almost equated it with racism. 
The economic argument was in tune with the historic pattern. Nativism 
was known to be associated with economic difficulties, especially high em-
ployment rates (Cornelious 1983). For example, after World War II, when 
homecoming soldiers found their jobs gone to Mexican laborers, Federal gov-
ernment enforced laws to sweep away Mexicans from California. By 1994, 
when Proposition 187 was proposed and passed, the economy in California 
was at the bottom of a five-year recession. The high unemployment rate and 
state budget deficit led many to believe that Proposition 187 was put on the 
ballot out of economic self-interest by the native residents of California. 
Among the politicians who supported the Proposition was incumbent gov-
ernor Pete Wilson. He entered the race for reelection with a bad state economy 
and trailed in polls at the initial stages. Soon he endorsed Proposition 187 and 
started to blame illegal immigrants for state budget deficit and causing un-
employment. The polls responded accordingly, with his popularity rising and 
finally surpassing his opponent. This shift of support for the gubernatorial 
candidates indicates that Wilson had successfully attracted those in favor of 
Proposition 187 to vote for him. In other words, many voters bought Wilson's 
argument that it was not his incompetence, but illegal aliens, who should be 
responsible for the deteriorating state economy. Given that Wilson promised 
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to solve the problem of illegal immigrants, they should vote for him if the 
economy was what concerned them most. 
The Democrat side of the campaign tried to show that the Proposition was 
not about economics. They insisted that Wilson, not illegal immigrants, was 
the obstacle to economic.recovery. The Democratic Party revealed that Wilson 
and his wife hired illegal immigrants as their nanny4 some years back, and so 
did Republican Senator candidate Michael Hu:ffington who also took a strong 
pro-Proposition 187 stand. Their argument was clearly not well received as 
Brown lost to Wilson eventually. The Democrat's camp has either failed to 
convey the idea well that Californians have benefited from illegal immigrants 
as cheap labor, or has encountered a voting public whose majority would want 
to reduce the number of illegal immigrants for other reasons. 
History also shows that nativism has always been accompanied by discrim-
inatory treatment toward ethnic minorities. In the early part of this century, 
Asian laborers were excluded from jobs other than railway building. In the 
1950's, Asian American scholars with international reputation were not allowed 
to buy houses in California. In the so-called "Operation Wetback" in 1954, 
when the economy soured after the Korean War, Mexican Americans were de-
ported by police and INS agents militaristically together with illegal Mexican 
immigrants. Similar treatment toward Anglo immigrants can not be found 
4Washington Post, May 5, 1995, page 3. 
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even though they have been a steady source of immigrants into California. 
So an alternative explanation for the passage of Proposition 187 was that 
it was a racial issue. To say the least, its proposed measures were misleading 
and could cause discrimination against Hispanic Americans. Since most of 
the illegal immigrants in California are from Mexico, with similar accent and 
skin color, many Hispanic Americans could encounter unpleasant treatment 
as suspected illegal immigrants. In the October 1994 Field Poll, over 45% 
of Hispanic respondents said the passage of Proposition 187 would encourage 
discrimination against minorities. 5 To say the worst, it was an effort to stereo-
type economically disadvantaged minorities and thus to restrict the increase 
of the non-white population in California. White supremacist organizations 
like the Pioneer Fund were found bank-rolling the signature drive that put the 
proposition on the ballot. And civil rights organizations like American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) have been among the most visible opponents of the 
proposition. The Proposition has been an anti-discrimination civil rights issue 
for its opponents. 
With the supporting side emphasizing the economic motivation of the 
Proposition and the opposing side insisting on the racial bigotry behind it, 
the opinion on the immigration issue falls right into the theoretical debate 
5In the same survey, the percentages of white, black, and Asian voters who believed 
passing Proposition 187 would incur discrimination against minority were 27.1%, 32.5%, 
and 36. 7% respectively. 
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between realistic group conflict theory and the theory of symbolic prejudice. 
Based on previous literature and the political context, let us first look at the 
possibly dividing lines of the opinion. 
3.2.1 Economic Voting 
· A popular account of the passage of Proposition 187 is that voters as native 
residents vented their economic distress on the newcomers. In other words, it is 
a case where people's votes reflected their "pocket book," as often being shown 
in candidate elections (Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Markus 1988; Rosenstone 
1984; Tufte 1978). The electoral significance of economic performance in ref-
erenda voting was first studied by Bowler and Donovan (1994), who extended 
the retrospective voting model to the setting of referen_da voting. Their· anal-
ysis of voting behavior on a series of California initiatives found that when 
the economic conditions worsen, voters tend to vote in favor of the initiatives, 
i.e., changes of status quo. While if things are going well, voters tend to be 
risk averse and are more likely to say "no" on initiatives. In other words, 
incumbency-oriented voting behavior has a status quo-oriented projection in 
referenda voting. 
The evidence to support retrospective voting on Proposition 187 is ample. 
Since the end of the Cold War, California started to experience economic dif-
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ficulties due to aerospace and defense layoffs. Consequently, the early 1990s 
saw a rising unemployment rate, a shrinking economy, and a growing state 
budget deficit in California. As resources become scarce, illegal immigrants 
were perceived as thieves, stealing employment opportunities from legal resi-
dents and welfare benefits from a system to which they have not contributed 
anything. For example, in a Field Poll conducted in October 1994,6 68.9% of 
those who favored Proposition 187 believed that its passage meant more jobs 
for legal residents. Wilson also appealed to voters by emphasizing the fiscal 
impact of illegal immigrants on the state budget, namely the unfair burden on 
Californians of providing illegal aliens with health and education benefits. 
Yet retrospective voting theory is encountering an interesting case here. 
Following the argument by Bowler and Donovan, Proposition 187 should be 
passed due to the economic frustration of the native residents. However, ac-
cording to the retrospective voting model explaining candidate elections, in-
cumbent· Pete Wilson should not have been re-elected. In reality, voters re-
elected Wilson and passed Proposition 187. This phenomenon suggests that 
many voters may have bought Wilson's campaign and blamed the bad economy 
on illegal immigrants. If that is true, then voters did associate the economic 
performance with their vote choices. So given the data, I will first test if vot-
ers' opinions on economic performance are in any way associated with their 
6The election was held in November 1994. 
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vote choice on the Proposition. 
3.2.2 Ethnic Prejudice 
The awareness of illegal immigrants' racial/ethnic identity was apparently 
involved in voters' preference on the Proposition. For example, journalists 
have recorded that California farm owners supported Proposition 187, despite 
the fact that they depend almost exclusively upon immigrant laborers from 
Mexico. 7 Despite a close working relationship, many farm owners would not 
consider the Mexican farm workers "the same" people as they are. They dis-
liked the fact that these Mexicans cling to their own language and culture, and 
feel comfortable supporting Proposition 187 to deprive the benefits of a group 
of alien people. These observations imply that an anti-Mexican sentiment un-
related to economic interest could be behind the passage of the Proposition. 
Scholars hav~ found that racial/ ethnic identities could serve as the decision 
rule in elections. Pomper (1966) studied such a case and concluded that race 
and ethnicity were considered political information about candidates, in a con-
text where there was a lack of cues from parties. Other studies have also found 
high correlation between ethnic identity and voting behavior including both 
participation and perferences (Nelson 1979). According to Gordon (1967), 
7See, for example, ABC Nightly News with Peter Jennings, May 16, 1996. 
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ethnic voting is also expected if the dominant group in the society is resistant 
to the minority group's values and culture. In the case of illegal immigrants in 
California, most native residents were definitely not fond of hearing the new-
comers speaking their mother tongues. They passed a proposition to establish 
English as the only official language as early as 1984. A sense of ethnic identity 
should have played a role in their preference on Proposition 187. 
If indeed the supporters of Proposition 187 were compelled by a sentiment 
against a group of foreigners who neither speak English nor observe American 
traditions, then we should see correlation between one's vote choice and how 
akin he feels to these Spanish speaking illegal or new immigrants. For sim-
plicity, since more of the illegal immigrants are from Mexico, I would expect 
that voters of Hispanic ethnicity would be more likely to identify with the 
newcomers, and thus be less likely to vote based on ethnic prejudice. So if 
ethnic prejudice were the major drive of the support for the Proposition, the 
vote outcome would be divisive among Hispanics and non-Hispanics. 
In addition, ethnic prejudice may have a confounding effect with interest 
motivations. Many legal Hispanic residents live in the same neighborhood as 
illegal immigrants, where they experience heightened job competition, less ac-
cess to government services and a lower quality of life. Stories about conflicts 
between Mexican Americans and new (illegal) immigrants in some communi-
ties have often appeared in the local newspapers, with some typical titles as 
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"Natives, Newcomers at Odds in East L.A." .8 
The alienating effect of economic status within minority groups was first 
studied by Dahl (1961). He proposed a model portraying the minority group as 
highly heterogeneous socioeconomic group. Those group members with high 
income have gain influences outside their ethnic group; and tend to vote the 
same way as the majority group, while those who are low in status, income, 
and social influence tend to form a more cohesive voting bloc that may have 
different choices on some issues than the majority group do. 
Thus, in the analysis below I will measure the concentration of ethnic voting 
on Proposition 187 between Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters. In addition, 
I hypothesize that the better-established Hispanic voters are more likely to 
support Proposition 187 than other Hispanic voters. I use income levels as an . 
indicator of how well established a voter is. 
3.2.3 Ideology and Party Identification 
Many theoretical discussions of the value of direct democracy have argued 
that ideology and party identification should not be salient factors in referenda 
voting (Cronin 1989; Magleby 1984). Especially during the first two decades 
of this century when the populist movement pushed the adoption of ballot 
8By Sonia Nazario, Los Angeles Times, March 4, 1996. 
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voting in several states, scholars viewed direct democracy as an alternative 
to party politics. Key and Crouch (1939) did a thorough study on California 
referenda and proposition voting procedures, where they pointed out that the 
group of voters who initiate a direct legislative measure must be distant from 
political parties. The logic they offered was th~t if it was a group closely 
affiliated with either party who want to see a legislative measure established, 
the group can push the affiliated party to have the measure passed in the 
legislative houses which are controlled by the parties. In other words, direct 
democracy is motivated by some group(s) seeking their interest, not by party 
. organizations. 
Magleby, who carried out the first systematic study on referenda voting, 
also argued that parties have no incentive to take stands on ballot measures, 
because "a proposition rarely means any payoff to the electoral fortunes of 
the party candidates in the election." (Magleby 1984, 174) In his study on 
a series of propositions, however, he unexpectedly found that ideology .and 
party identification played important roles in shaping votes on ballot propo-
sitions consistently across issue areas and over time. For example, he found 
that since 1972 the California electorate has apparently relied on ideological 
predisposition to help determine their vote. However, because the predictabil-
ity of ideology and party identification was higher in partisan elections than 
in direct democracy, Magleby did not discuss further why ideology and party 
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identification were significant factors in referenda voting. 
Theoretically, scholars believe parties have no incentive to take sides on 
ballot measures, because any party stand on a proposition may alienate some 
voters. However, both parties have been actively involved in referenda vot-
ing, especially since Proposition 13 in 1978.9 Cronin (1989) has noted that 
governors and legislative leaders in several states, mostly Republicans, led the 
efforts to get the direct democracy enacted in their jurisdictions. In California, 
both parties get involved in referenda voting when the issue raised is salient. 
For example, famous politicians such as Ronald Reagan, Lyndon Johnson and 
Pat Brown initiated or backed certain propositions (Magleby 1984). The case 
of Proposition 187 appears to have followed this trend. The California Repub-
lican Party mailed 200,000 petitions to voters to help get enough signatures 
to put this initiative on the ballot. Both Pete Wilson and Michael Huffington 
took clear standing on the issue. So one way to look at the effect of partisan-
ship is that it is a systematic effect on voting behavior. It is necessary to take 
. control of it in this study of vote choice. 
Another behavioral assumption involves the effect of ideology. Referenda 
voting is by nature single-issue politics, so placing the issue along the ideology 
spectrum is a way for the voters to simplify their decision-making process. 
9Proposition 13 in June 1978 was adopted by Californians to cut their property taxes by 
at least half. 
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Scholars have noted that voters are usually uninformed on proposition issues 
(Magleby 1884; Cronin 1989). If one could interpret a ballot measure into 
liberal or conservative terms, one can vote according to his preferred ideological 
stance. The well-established literature on the spatial model of voting has 
shown that it is an effective way to describe the voters' decision making process 
(Downs 1956; Enelow and Hinich 1984). Given that Proposition 187 concerns a 
single issue, I assume that ideological standing had its share of effect in shaping 
the preferences. So like partisanship, ideology is an important dimension to 
control for as in any voting behavior analysis. 
To summarize, I have three hypothesized dividing lines of opinion to test. 
First, I expect to see economic satisfaction differentiate vote choice, with pos-
itive evaluation of the economy correlating negatively with the probability of 
supporting the Proposition. The second possible division is between Hispanic 
and non-Hispanic voters. Hispanics would be more likely to vote against the 
Proposition compared with non-Hispanic voters of similar socioeconomic back-
ground. But Hispanic voters with higher incomes would vote more similarly 
as non-Hispanic voters did. Last, I expect to see opinions being influenced 
by ideology and partisanship. Republicans and conservatives should be more 
likely to support the Proposition than Democrats and liberal. 
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3.3 A First Look: An Exit Poll Analysis 
In this section I use a set of survey data to do a preliminary examination of the 
validity of the above hypotheses. The survey is an exit poll conducted by the 
Los Angeles Times, called LAT Poll in the following context. The LAT Poll 
asked the respondents how they voted in the election, their opinions on some 
political and social issues, and their personal socioeconomic conditions. It con-
sisted of 9481 respondents in California. It contains interesting information 
of how people voted on Proposition 187 corresponding to their socioeconomic 
status. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the vote on Proposition 187 broken 
down by relevant factors: ideology and party identification, income and edu-
cation levels, race and ethnicity, and gender and age groups. The number of 
respondents who answered all the relevant questions is 5286. 
A brief examination of the data in Table 3.1 shows that the relationship be-
tween respondents' economic evaluations and their vote-choice is rather loose. 
First, we see the invariance of vote differentiated by changes on personal fi-
nances. Compare those who said they were worse off financially with those 
better off, and we see only 3% more of former voted for the Proposition. Even 
more striking is that the evaluation of the California economy had an effect 
opposite to that predicted: 53.7% of the voters who thought the economy in 
California was worse off supported the Proposition, while 59.4% of those who 
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Table 3.1: Support for Proposition 187 by Demographic 
For Against No Vote 
% N % N % N 
Personal finance 
Better 54.7 651 44.5 530 0.8 10 
Same 53.7 994 45.3 .839 1.0 19 
Worse 57.6 985 41.8 714 0.6 10 
California economy 
Right track 59.4 990 39.9 664 0.7 12 
Wrong track 53.7 1509 45.5 1278 0.9 24 
Ethnicity 
White 59.7 2242 39.7 1489 0.6 23 
Hispanics 23.6 98 75.0 312 1.4 6 
Black 43.8 113 53.9 139 2.3 6 
Asian 47.1 82 51.7 90 1.1 2 
Other 60.8 104 38.0 65 1.2 2 
Ideology 
Liberal 24.2 223 75.2 692 0.5 5 
Middle-of-the-road 52.7 1135 46.5 1001 0.9 19 
Conservative 76.5 1261 22.7 374 0.8 13 
Party Identification 
Democrat 32.5 628 66.3 1281 1.1 22 
Independent 57.8 413 41.7 298 0.6 4 
Republican 78.0 1524 21.6 423 0.4 7 
Other or no party 41.9 54 56.6 73 1.6 2 
Education 
Less than high school 60.1 98 39.3 64 0.6 1 
High/vocational school 62.9 421 35.6 238 1.5 10 
Less than Bachelor 59.9 823 39.4 . 541 0.7 9 
Less than Master 54.6 743 44.9 611 0.5 7 
Master and above 48.5 181 50.7 189 0.8 3 
Religion 
Protestant 67.0 941 32.4 455 0.6 8 
Other Christian 67.0 511 32.1 245 0.9 11 
Roman Catholic 47.9 562 51.2 600 0.9 7 
Other religion 42.1 293 57.0 236 0.9 6 
No religion 45.3 325 53.9 387 0.8 6 
Income 
Under $20,000 49.6 245 48.4 239 2.0 10 
$20,000-$39,000 53.7 550 45.3 464 1.0 10 
$40,000-$59,000 55.9 638 43.6 497 0.5 6 
$60,000-$7 4,000 55.9 365 43.9 289 0.6 4 
Above $75,000 57.4 734 41.9 536 0.6 8 
Entire Sample 55.1 2932 43.10 2295 1.11 59 
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thought things were going well supported it. Such a relationship implies that 
opinion on the Proposition might have not been correlated with retrospective 
assessments of economic performance in the expected way. So in· the follow-
ing analysis I will check if this is indeed the case after controlling for other 
variables. 
Not surprisingly, race and ethnicity seem to have mattered. Of Hispanic 
voters 75% opposed Proposition 187, higher than any other group of Non-
Hispanic voters. Whites favored the Proposition in general, with 59. 7% sup-
porting it and 39.7% rejecting it. African-American and Asian-American vot-
ers split on it, with slight more favoring the Proposition. 
But voting on Proposition 187 seems best predicted by ideology and parti-
sanship. As many as 75.2% of those who considered themselves liberal voted 
against the Proposition, while 76.5% of conservatives supported it. Those 
who were ideologically moderate were more likely to favor the Proposition 
than to oppose it (52.7% vote "yes" and 46.5% "no"). Such a distribution 
suggests that many voters interpreted Proposition 187 along ideological lines. 
Compared with ideology, party identification appears to be an even better 
indicator for Republicans: a 78.0% and 21.6% division of votes in favor of 
the Proposition. There was a weaker relationship for Democrats, with 66.3% 
voted "yes" on the Proposition. This indicates that Wilson's campaign might 
have led Republican voters to support this Proposition. 
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Next, the effects of education levels and religious beliefs also appear to be 
strong. As a voter's education level goes up, her support of the Proposition 
goes down steadily. Comparing the two extremes, i.e., from a high school 
dropout to a master (or doctoral) degree holder, we see a 15.4% decrease in 
the percentage of "yes" voters on this Proposition~ An even 'mo:re interesting 
phenomenon is that Christian voters supported the Proposition much more 
than secular voters and voters with other religious beliefs. Protestant and 
other Christian voters indicated a more than 2/3 chance in favor of passing 
Proposition 187, while more than half of the other voters opposed the Propo-
sition. There is no direct evidence that Catholics were more likely to oppose 
the Proposition, though the Catholic church has been accused of supporting 
illegal immigration.10 In fact, Catholics closely followed other Christians in 
supporting the Proposition. 
Last, breaking voters by income levels reveals that the sample includes dis-
proportionally more middle- and upper-class voters, since nearly 30% of those 
who revealed their income levels report annual household income higher than 
$75,000, 43.4% higher than $60,000. The breakdowns show that support for 
Proposition 187 increased with household income level, though the variation 
was rather small across groups. At each income level more than half of the 
voters supported the Proposition. 
10See, for example, Stephen Mumford, "Illegal immigration, National Security, and the 
church,'' The Humanist, 41:6, 1981, pp. 24-30. 
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Given this preliminary examination, we start to have a feeling for who 
might be more likely to support a Proposition to exclude illegal immigrants. 
First, ideologically conservative voters and Republican voters supported the 
Proposition overwhelmingly. Second, Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters re-
ally split on the issue, with Hispanic voters much less likely to support the 
Proposition. This discrepancy was similar among Democrats and Republi-
cans, with more Republicans voting for the Proposition. And third, it seems 
that retrospective evaluations of the state economy or personal finances were 
not effective in differentiating voters' choices. In addition, education levels 
were negatively correlated with support for the Proposition, and income lev-
els were positively correlated with the probability to support the Proposition. 
Yet, all of these are only bivariate correlations between vote choice and one 
of the explanatory factors. Without multivariate anci.lysis, we can not come 
to any meaningful conclusions. Especially in this case where income, religion, 
and other factors may have confound effect with race/ethnicity. So in the fol-
lowing section, I present a multivariate regression model that will jointly test 
all the hypotheses. 
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3.4 Who Voted for Proposition 187? 
Given the data set shown in Table 3.1 where voters' choices are discrete, I 
fit a probit model11 to predict the probability that voters will support Propo-
sition 187.12 To test the retrospective voting theory, I use the respondents' 
assessments of the change in their personal finances over the past year, and · 
the respondents' opinion if the economy in California was doing well. For both 
variables pessimistic responses were coded lower. 
To measure the extent of racial voting, I use a variable, H, that is coded 
"l" if the respondent is Hispanic and "0" if otherwise. Further, H is mul-
tiplied with other relevant variables to capture the different effects of that 
variable across Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters. H is combined with both 
variables indicating the assessment of changes in personal finance and the state 
of California economy, and education and income levels. Education is mea-
sured by respondents' years of schooling and income level is measured by the 
respondent's annual household income. Larger numbers indicate higher levels. 
I include ideology and party identification in the model, and test for para-
metric differences between Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters. In both cases, 
I define dummy variables to denote liberals or conservatives, and Democrats 
11 I use probit instead of logit model here because the normal distribution assumption is 
used in the method applied to the aggregate data analysis later. 
12To make the model straightforward, I only consider the choices of either voting "yes" 
or voting "no,'' excluding the choice of abstaining. 
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or Republicans as compared to the ideologically middle-of-the-road voters and 
Independent voters respectively. 
In addition, I expect religious beliefs to influence the vote-choice. Since few 
Hispanic voters are ~rotestant or Christian, I only differentiate the Catholic 
voters by ethnicity. Though in Table 3.1 Catholic voters appear more support-
ive of the Proposition than other non-Protestants, I expect Hispanic Catholics 
to be much less likely to support the Proposition than non-Hispanic Catholic 
voters. To control for other socioeconomic factors, I also control for age and 
gender differences. Age might be correlated with the assimilation and nat-
uralization process. The opinion of more senior voters may tell how more 
established residents felt about new comers. Female voters might have been 
more sympathetic toward the children of illegal immigrants, thus less moti-
vated to support a legislation to put these children out of school. 
With the above specification, my model is summarized as follows: 
Prob( voting "yes") = a + X (3 + L( a' + X (3) + E (3.1) 
where the X contains variables pertaining to different hypotheses, and (3 is a 
vector of coefficients. The dummy variable H stands for Hispanic ethnicity. 
To examine the effect of retrospective voting, I look to the coefficients of the 
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economic assessment variables. For the ethnic voting account, the coefficients 
of the dummy variables are of primary interest. And finally, to inspect the ef-
fect of partisan voting in this non-partisan election, the coefficients on ideology 
and party identification are examined. 
The estimates of the probit models are reported in Table 3.2. In the left 
column I list all the independent variables and the right columns present coef-
ficients of the regressions, which can be translated into probability terms. In 
the sample used to generate these estimates, 43.78% of the respondents voted 
against the Proposition and 56.22% for it. The model correctly predicts 73.0% 
of all individual vote choices. 
To make the estimated coefficients more meaningful, I transformed them 
into probability terms in Table 3.3. To illustrate this, let us assume a typical 
voter from the sampled respondents, who has the most represented character-
istics in each category. That is, she thinks the economy in California was not 
doing well; her personal financial situation remained the same over the past 
year; and she is middle-of-the-road in terms of ideology, with no party affil-
iation; she has an annual household income above $70,000 and some college 
education. In Table 3.3, I show that when holding other variables constant at 
the typical voter's level, changing one particular variable would result in the 
probability of one casting a supporting vote for Proposition 187. 
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Table 3.2: Probit Regression Estimates of Vote Choice 





Personal finance with H 
California economy 
California economy with H 
California and personal 
California and personal with H 
Ideology 
Ideology with H 
Democrat 
Democrat with H 
Republican 
Republican with H 
Income level 
Income with H 
Education level 
Education level with H 
Protestant 
Catholic 
· Catholic with H 
Other Christian 
Gender (female) 
Gender with H 
Age 
Age with H 
Number of observations 
Percent correctly predicted 
Coefficients for 
Model I Model II 
-0.18 (0.15) -0.30 (0.15*) 















































Note: Entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
* indicates an estimate significant at the p = .05 level. 
** indicates an estimate significant at the p = .10 level. 
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Table 3.3: Effects of Economy, Ethnicity, Ideology, and Partisanship 






















Less than high school 
High /vocational school 
Less than Bachelor 
Less than Master 
Master and above 
PROBABILITY OF VOTING FOR PROPOSITION 187 BY 





















Note: Table entries are the predicted probabilities of a hypothetkal individual 
voting for Proposition 187 based upon the row-variables. The number in the 
parentheses is the variation within one standard deviation. The profile for this 
hypothetical voter is discussed in the text. 
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The economy. Contrary to my first hypothesis, I find that neither voters' 
assessment of their personal financial conditions nor their assessments of the 
California economy have statistically significant influences on their decision to 
vote yes on Proposition 187. More surprisingly, it appears that voters' eval-
uation of the California economy is positively correlated with their suppor~ 
of Proposition 187. To further display the relationship between voters' ret-
. rospective thinking and their vote-choice, I developed another variable which 
indicates if the voter thinks both his personal and the statewide economic con-
ditions grew worse or got better. I rerun the probit model with this variable 
replacing the two previous economic variables, and report it as Model II in 
Table 3.1. This variable does not show any significant effects, either. Thus 
this finding rejects the hypothesis of retrospective voting. 
Ideology and Partisanship. As expected, ideological standing and party 
identification are statistically significant in the model. Ideologically conser-
vative voters and Republican voters tend to vote for the proposition, while 
· liberal and Democrats tend to vote against it, compared with the ideologically 
moderate and Independent voters. When the effect of Hispanic ethnicity is 
combined with these two factors, the sign of the coefficient for ideology is re-
versed, though it is not statistically different from the patterns of non-Hispanic 
voters. Similarly, when compared with non-Hispanic voters, Hispanic voters 
tend to be less influenced by party identification, though not significantly ei-
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ther. Table 3.3 shows that, given the same ideology stands and partisanship, 
Hispanic voters have much lower probability of voting yes on Proposition 187, 
though with greater variation. 
Ethnic voting. The coefficient for H in Table 3.2 shows that the thresh-
old for Hispanic voters to support the Proposition is significantly higher than 
for the non-Hispanic voters. In Table 3.3, I calculate that the average prob-
ability of a Hispanic voter to support the Proposition is 36%, compared with 
a 68% by the non-Hispanics. In other words, given that all other personal 
characteristics are the same, Hispanic ethnicity accounts for a 32% difference 
in vote-choice. Another clear pattern is that the coefficients for the terms 
with dummy variables tend to be of opposite signs of those without dummy 
variables (except for gender and age). In other words, Hispanic voters were 
less influenced by those factors and tended to support Proposition 187 at a 
lower rate. However, the results also indicate that none of the coefficients for 
the dummy variables are significantly different from those without the dummy 
variables at the 5% level. Thus the effect of these independent variables on 
voters' decision are roughly the same across Hispanic voters and non-Hispanic 
voters. Table 3.3 helps illustrate that the shift in probabilities along scales is 
similar for most variables across non-Hispanic and Hispanic voters. For exam-
ple, there is a 27% increase in the probability of supporting the Proposition if 
one changes from a liberal to conservative for non-Hispanic voters, while there 
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is a 24 % increase for Hispanic voters. Thus the hypothesis of ethnic voting is 
revealed by the 32% differences between the average supporting rates across 
non-Hispanic voters and Hispanic voters. We see some two-thirds of the His-
panic voters opposed the Proposition, making clear a gap between Hispanic 
and n~n-Hispanic voters. 
It is important to look into how this 32% difference varies according to dif-
ferent socioeconomic conditions. The model shows that income levels are not 
statistically significant in determining vote-choice, which implies that voters 
of all income levels had a similar probability of supporting the Proposition. It 
is conceivable that lower income voters would have concerns over job replace-
ment, while higher income voters support the Proposition to save tax dollars. 
Overall, higher income voters were more likely to support the Proposition 
more, though not significantly. 
By comparison, a voter's education level is able to differentiate vote-choice: 
the better educated opposed the Proposition more than the less educated, and 
more so for non-Hispanic voters. In fact, for high school dropouts, a non-
Hispanic voter has a 40% higher chance than a Hispanic voter to support the 
Proposition, but the difference decreases to 21 % for master or higher degree 
holders. Two reasons may account for this difference. First, better-educated 
voters worry less about job displacement since most illegal immigrants engage 
in low skill work. Secondly, scholars have long associated a voter's education 
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level with one's ability to be politically informed (Popkin 1991). This argument 
maintains that better-educated voters perceived illegal immigrants with less 
antagonism. Further, this suggests education bridged the differences between 
voters of different ethnic backgrounds. Table 3.3 shows that the 21 % difference 
for master or higher degree holders is the smallest of all differences. 
The effects from income and education levels to some extent confirm Dahl's 
theory of assimilation, which predicts that the political behavior of minorities 
with higher social class is more similar to the majority group in the society 
than those with lower social status. In this case, if income indicates social 
class, then higher class Hispanic voters supported the Proposition more than 
the lower class voters, though with quite some variation. On the other hand, 
if we consider education levels as the symbol of social status, Hispanic "elites" 
agreed with non-Hispanics "elites" much more. So I conclude there is differ-
entiation in the voting behavior of minority group, which can be traced by 
socioeconomic conditions. The higher income and better-educated voters are 
more likely to hold the same political views as the majority. 
In sum, the probit analysis questions the retrospective voting hypothe-
sis, but confirms the hypothesis of ethnic voting and the effect by ideology 
and partisanship. It is rather unexpected that economic concerns could not 
differentiate people's preference on the Proposition. The data bears strong ev-
idence that voters used ideological standing and partisanship to help deciding 
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on their vote choice. This finding agrees with the literature that direct democ-
racy in California has become more entangled with party politics. In other 
words, ideology and partisanship are becoming systematic factors in referenda 
voting. 
3.5 Further Discussion 
I set out to test the presence of interest conflict and ethnic prejudice in Propo-
sition 187 voting. Three main findings come out from the data analysis. First, 
Proposition 187 was definitely not a racially neutral issue. Second, there was 
relatively weak evidence supporting realistic conflict theory. Last, the strong 
effects by partisanship and ideology suggests that voters were heavily influ-
enced by the campaigns during the election. 
The weak show of retrospective voting does not mean the absence of con-
cerns for interest conflict. Retrospective thinking is not the only source of 
voters' perceptions of economic threat by illegal immigrants. For example, 
an alternative view could be prospective thinking. Notice that voters who 
thought the economy in California was going well actually were more likely to 
vote for the Proposition, though not significantly. If the logic were that a bet-
ter economy would lure more illegal immigrants to come, then Proposition 187 
seemed particularly relevant in regulating the increasing population. But with 
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the LAT poll, we simply do not have the data on how voters thought about 
the economy prospectively. In any case, rejecting retrospective voting is not 
equivalent to rejecting interest conflict as a motivation for the anti-immigration 
legislation. 
It is easy to add a test of prospective voting on the issue. The data set in 
Chapter 5 will allow an examination on the correlation between voters' views 
on the prospect of national economy and their opinion on immigration policy. 
But it is more complicated to capture the indirect influences on the perception 
of interest conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2, realistic interest conflict is only 
what is perceived as realistic. In this case, I consider the influences from three 
aspects. 
First, a collective interest at the local level is relevant to the perception. It 
is possible that one perceived the threat of unemployment or welfare spending 
by illegal immigrants as independent of personal well being or the performance 
of state economy. Through Wilson's campaign, voters might have developed 
impressions that illegal immigrants were draining the state budget no matter 
whether the economy was good or bad. Or maybe because the media had been 
informing them that the unemployment rate was rising to a new high, they 
wanted to restrict the inflow of cheap labor to lower the unemployment rate, 
even if they had been doing well personally. In other words, voters may be 
thinking about the economy in their city, county, or even the whole country 
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which just happen to be neither at the personal nor the state level as the 
survey captured. To explore these possibilities, I will analyze the effect by 
social contexts in the following chapter. 
Specifically; in Chapter 4, I will examine whether vote choice was likely to 
be the result of the economic and social characteristics of the county the vote 
resided in. I explore the "Bay Area Phenomenon" and discuss if economic 
concerns were in effect at certain collective level. The result will show how 
the county level economic characteristics fo.fl.uence voters' preferences on the 
Proposition. 
Second, I compare people's opinions by how close they live to minorities. 
With the data analysis in Chapter 4, I can find out whether county level racial 
composition had any effect on the vote outcome. The logic is that those who 
lived more distant to minorities had less information or experience to help 
form their perception. With less information, how they projected the threat 
became a more interesting question. Chapter 5 also continues the exploring 
with a survey sample that was conducted nationwide. Comparing it with the 
California case, we can generalize if the anti-immigration sentiment had the 
same motives everywhere in the country. Chapter 6 brings the focus back to 
Los Angeles to study the urban perspective on immigrants. In particular, I 
analyze how inner city minorities, who lived close to new immigrants, perceived 
the impact by new immigrants. 
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The last aspect is information in campaigns. A rather unexpected finding 
from this data analysis is how strongly ideological positions and partisanship 
influenced Proposition 187 voting. It seems that voters were quite receptive 
to party's ot candidates' reasoning on the issue. Such strong influence sug-
gests two possibilities. One is that voters depended on party politics to get 
information on the issue. This case certainly reduces the chance that voters 
were seriously informed on the issue of illegal immigration, and implies un-
certainty in opinion formation when in absence of political campaigns. The 
other possibility is that the issue just happened to be divisive along ideological 
standings. To test for both possibilities, in Chapter 6, I model uncertainty in 
opinion with a survey data that was not taken in the context of any political 
event. 
All of these further analyses are designed to differentiate both voters and 
issues into different types, so that we can distinguish the effect of economic 
concerns and racial prejudice more rigorously. These studies should help to 
· clarify the motivation problem on the anti-immigration legislation surge in 
the recent years. More importantly, it can tell more about the logic of opinion 
formation on policies and issues. 
Another important reason for further analysis is that the findings in this 
chapter are solely based on survey data. Many scholars have questioned the 
validity of survey returns. Converse (1986) showed that survey responses sub-
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ject to the style of the questionnaires and the interviewers. Zaller and Feldman 
(1992) pointed out even if survey interviewees "answer questions," they may 
not be "revealing preferences." Survey responses are often tempered by fram-
ing of the issue or peoples desire to appear politically correct on sensitive issues 
in front of the interviewer. Consequentially survey answers are expected to 
have large variance. In the LAT poll, we see that support rate for Proposition 
187 is about 55%, about 4% lower than the real vote outcome. It is possible 
that the racial overtone of the issue prevented people from reporting truthfully. 
An alternative way is to use actural vote outcomes. Due to the secret ballot, 
all vote records are available at some aggregate level. In the past, scholars have 
often shunned from analyzing aggregate data because of the methodological 
difficulties involved. Facilitated with a new breakthrough in methodology, I 
will analyze the vote record on Proposition 187 in Chapter 4 with a method 
called "generalized method of bounds. The findings there can cross-validate 
the findillgs in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
REGIONAL EFFECTS AND PERCEIVED 
THREAT 
Many factors could contribute to the perceptions of American citizens towards 
newcomers. Although in the LAT survey, retrospective economic evaluation 
and personal well being could not predict people's preferences on Proposition 
187, we can not conclude yet that support for Proposition 187 was not nativism 
driven by interest conflict. As discussed in Chapter 2, the theory of realistic 
conflict is closely linked to one's definition of group interest. If an individual's 
sense of shared fate with her group members is strong enough, she may act 
for the benefits of her group members instead of her own. In the case of 
Proposition 187, some voters many have supported for it because they saw 
their neighbors losing jobs or read about the rising unemployment statistics, 
despite that they were doing fine themselves. 
In this chapter, I study the regional effects in Proposition 187 voting. Re-
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gional characteristics are types of social contexts. Social contexts have long 
been regarded as important determinants of voting behavior in addition to 
individual characteristics of each voter (Alexander et al. 1987; Blalock 1984; 
Huber 1991; Kelley and McAllister 1985; McAllister 1987). Despite the in-
creasing amount of research based upon the assumption that voters are ratio-
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nal individuals who vote to maximize their individual utilities, there is plenty 
of evidence showing that social contexts should not be neglected as they add 
externalities to voter's utilities. For example, urban neighborhood and county 
are known to have contextual influences on voters (Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1987; MacKuen and Brown 1987). 
In fact, regional variation is probably the most common contextual effect. 
Theoretically, regional differences can be the results from either the composi-
tion of the population of the region, or the influences of regional characteristics 
over its residents. Charnock (1996) called them compositional effects and con-
textual effects. Obviously, to distinguish contextual effects from compositional 
effects, we need information of interest on all the individuals in the region. For 
example, if we see county one passed and county two failed Proposition 187, 
and we know the two counties are vastly different in terms of ethnic composi-
tion or average income level, we can not tell whether it was these county level 
characteristics that caused the different vote outcome. If we know (say, from 
surveys) that Democrats tended to oppose the Proposition and Republicans 
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support it, then the first thing to check would be whether county one has more 
Republican and county two has more Democrats. Without controlling for the 
effect of partisanship, we can do any meaningful comparison of the effects by 
county level characteristics. 
A recent example is the work by Tolbert and Hero {1996) on Proposition 
187 in California. Regressing vote outcome on county level minority popula-
tions, they found that in counties with large Hispanic population and small 
population of other minorities ("bifurcated counties"), the support rate for 
Proposition 187 was higher. But their model is fundamentally flawed by con-
fusing the compositional effects with contextual effects. Suppose what they 
found was true. One can not possibly tell whether the extra support in these 
"bifurcated counties" came from voters in all or some special group. If it came 
from voters in all groups, then the variation across counties might be contex-
tual.. Otherwise it could be compositional, as these counties might have more 
Republican voters who were believed to favor the Proposition. Without know-
ing the answer, there can not be a meaningful discussion of how bifurcated 
ethnic composition has shaped vote outcomes as a contextual factor. 
However, empirically, data on individual characteristics such as partisan-
ship, education levels, ethnic backgrounds, and so on, are rarely available for 
all the individuals in each region. More often, surveys obtain individual level 
data but of only a small portion of all residents in certain region; government 
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records may report region-wide statistics but aggregately. Methodologically, 
inferring individual level information from aggregate data has been a diffi-
cult problem that is traditionally known as the fallacy of "ecological infer-
ence." Without an actual record of each individual's votes and socioeconomic 
background, demonstrating the existence or non-existence of contextual effects 
across regions is extremely difficult. 
Correctly dealing with ecological inference is an inevitable route to disen-
tangling the contextual effects from compositional effects. The literature on 
solving the "ecological inference" problem is remarkably rich yet controversial. 
Ever since the so-called "Goodman's regression" (Goodman 1953), dozens of 
models have appeared in the literature (Achen and Shively 1995; Ansolabehere 
and Rivers 1995; Grofman et al. 1985; King 1997; Kousser 1973; Palmquist 
1994; Prais and Achison 1954). Despite the potential contribution of each 
methodological breakthrough, not many scholars other than the authors of 
the models have ever utilized these ecological inference models to explore pos-
sible contextual effects. In this chapter, I will apply King's generalized method 
of bounds (King 1997) to approximate how votes were divided along individ-
ual characteristic, such as ethnic background, or party identification, in every 
county. Afterwards, I used the reconstructed individual behavior to test the 
effects of county level characteristics on the support for Proposition 187. 
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4.1 Generalized Method of Bounds 
The data used in this analysis is the vote record aggregated at the precinct 
level, compiled by the Institute of Government Studies in Berkeley from the 
California Statement of Vote and Statement of Registration1 (IGS data). Th~ 
City and County Data Book, 1994 provides census data on the economic statis-
· tics and racial/ethnic composition of each county. 
In essence, what this generalized method of bounds does is to estimate the 
joint probabilities from marginal probabilities in a two by two contingency 
table. For example, if one margin gives percentage of votes divided between 
yes and no, the other tells percentage of voters of Hispanic and of non-Hispanic 
ethnicity, then the method can approximate the percentage of Hispanic voters 
who vote "yes." Specifically, in this study, we can summarize the IGS data as 
the table on the next page. 
Empirically, the quantities denoted by the English letters in the table are 
what is known, while those denoted by the Greek letters are what we want 
to find out. The number of total voters was recorded in the Statement of 
Registration, and the turnout rate was recorded in the Statement of Vote. The 
percentage of Hispanic voters was approximated from the 1990 census, as IGS 
1 Published by California's Secretary of State Office. The data set compiled by the IGS 
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1. Xi, Ti each indicates a proportion out of ni. 
NOT TURNOUT 
1 - flf 
1- {3f' 
2. f3 is a proportion out of Xi. {3f' is the proportion of whites who vote in the 
ith precinct; {3f is the proportion of blacks who vote in the ith precinct. 
3. The superscripts indicate the race of voting-age person.2 
4. >.. is the proportion of voters who turn out and vote for a Democrat. 
data merged census tracks with precincts. 3 
Let's look at the right half of the table and solve f3 with T and X first. An 
"accounting identity" summarizes the relationship between the knowns and 
the unknowns: 
The question now is that for every observation i, we have two parameters to 
estimate: {3f and {3f'. 
To solve this problem, traditionally scholars have tried to reduce the num-
ber of parameters in certain ways. For example, one way to estimate the 
3 See Appendix A for details of how the merge is done. 
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accounting identity is to assume that all (3/s are the same. This is substan-
tively equivalent to assuming that the proportion of whites voting is constant 
across precincts, and that the proportion of blacks voting is constant across 
precincts. Then we have two parameters (f3w and f3b), and as many observa-
tions as the number of precincts. Such an estimation :qiethod was proposed by 
Leo Goodman in 1953 (Goodman 1953), and still shows up in journal papers 
nowadays from time to time. The Tolbert and Hero paper mentioned in the 
last section is one example. 
Besides the problem that {31 may not be the same as (3101 , a practical 
constraint also prevents Goodman's regression from giving reliable answers. 
That is, sometimes the estimated f3 is out of the range of [O, l]. And it is 
rather hard to face a turnout rate of negative amount or over 100%. More 
precisely, we can narrow down the range of f3i's as follows: 
In fact, the problem here is not that different from classic regression anal-
ysis. For simplicity, suppose we observe a bunch of data points in a two-
dimensional space. Assuming the Gauss-Markov conditions, we fit a regres-
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sion line to extract information from the data by minimizing the discrepancies 
between the line and the data. In other words, we obtain ~ and its distri-
bution to summarize the information the data carry. Now the case goes up 
one dimension. A slight rearrangement of the accounting identity shows that 
instead of data points, now we observe data lines, all of which have negative 
slopes and are in a unit square: 
(4.1) 
So instead of fitting a line in two dimensions, we can fit a two dimension 
contour to encircle the intersections of the many observed lines. Figure 4.1 
provides a visual feeling of what it can look like. Notice that every line in the 
graph is determined by equation (1), and that they all show negative slopes. 
Like the regression lines that are the projection of a three-dimensional 
distribution onto a two-dimensional surface, the contour lines in the figure 
are also the projection of a bivariate distribution, with the parameters of the 
distribution printed at the top of the figure. Figure 4.2 helps to illustrate 
....... 
Figure 4.1 from a different dimension. 
To put this in words, what this approach does is to assume that the param-
eters we want to estimate, each {Jf and {J'!f, are drawn from some distribution. 
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This is the same as Figure 6.3 from A Solution to the Ecological 
Inference Problem.; 
Every line in the graph is determined by equation (1). So they 
all have negative slopes. 
Notice: 
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Figure 4.2: Another View of Figure 4.1 
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The distribution will have a set of parameters that we can estimate. With the 
estimated distribution, we can then obtain a univariate distribution as each 
negative-sloped lines in Figure 3.1 slices the three-dimensional distribution in 
Figure 6.4. The two-dimensional cross section will then be the posterior dis-
tribution of each /Ji conditional on all the information borrowed from all other 
precincts. 
Three assumptions are required by the model: 
Assumption 1. /Jf, f3? are generated by a truncated bivariate normal dis-
tribution conditional on xi, i.e., 
P(f3f,f3i) =TN(f3f,f3i I B,~) 
where 
Assumption 2. /Jf, /3'? are mean independent of Xi, i.e., completely unre-
lated. 
Assumption 3. Value of Ti in different precincts are independent after 
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conditioning on xi. 
It might be helpful to reiterate these three assumptions with a concrete 
example. Say that we are interested in knowing the Hispanic turnout rate in 
each precinct in California. In order to apply generalized method of bounds, 
we would want three things. First, we assume that the Hispanic turnout . 
rate in each precinct is generated by one distribution: a normal distribution 
truncated between 0 and 1. Second, the Hispanic turnout rate in each precinct 
is independent of the percentage of Hispanic population in the precinct. In 
other words, there is no correlation between the number of Hispanic voters in 
a precinct and the percentage of them who will turnout to vote. And third, 
the total turnout rate in each precinct is independent of the racial composition 
in the precinct. 
It is also worth pointing out that the three assumptions are reasonable 
and not stringent. Though some author has questioned the validity of this 
model when the assume.cl distribution in assumption one is changed to be bi-
modal, people have yet to find any incidences where turnout rates or any joint 
probabilities are bi-modal (Tam 1997). Instead, normality is assumed in most 
of the voting models. In addition, assumption 2 and 3 can be relaxed without 
affecting the efficiency of the method. 4 
4For details, please see King 1997. 
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For the simplicity of notations, let's call the vector of parameters of the 
truncated bivariate normal distribution in Assumption 1 w, and the untrun-
cated version of it '1t. They each have 5 elements in the vector: 2 mean 
parameters, 2 variance parameters, and a covariance parameter. Obviously 
they ar:e what we want in order to derive the point es~imation of all (3' s. For 
the convenience of estimation, '1t is transformed to ¢ with Fisher's "Z trans-
formation" (1915). It is important to keep in mind that w, '1t, and ¢ can 
be derived from each other easily, and we first approach ¢which is easier to 
estimate. 
Bayesian updating yields a way to derive ¢ from the known data of Tf s. 
Specifically, P(cp IT)= P(cp)P(T I¢), where P(cp) is the a prior, and P(T I¢) 
is the likelihood function. For the a prior, the mean parameters as elements 
in the vector ¢ are assumed to be flat, the variance parameters are log half-
normal with variance of 0.5, and the covariance parameter is normal with 
mean 0 arid standard deviation 0.5. The likelihood function is multiplication 
of normal distributions of Ti conditional on .q,. Given both, we can figure out 
the posterior distribution P( ¢ I T). 
Having a posterior distribution of¢ brings us one step closer to obtaining 
cl>, which will determine the distribution of (3' s. The above three assumptions 






But what we ultimately need is the unconditional posterior distribution of 
f3f. There are a couple of ways to get there. First, we can try to integrate it 
up from¢. Namely, we solve for 
P(f3f I T) ex j P(f3f, <P I T)d</J 




P(f3f IT) = -00 P(</J I T)P(/3f IT, ift)d'1i-
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with all the help we can get from the computer. Instead of carrying out the 
integration, we can use the Monte Carlo method to simulate the posterior 
distribution. The logic is that with enough sample points of W, P(f3f I T, W) 
will be equivalent to P(f3f I Ti)· In other words, the computer simulates the 
integration process by filling the area to integrate with an possible values, thus 
gives us a kernal density of the unconditional distribution. 
The exact steps to accomplish this are not difficult. Remember that I 
already got the distribution of¢. Now, draw a ¢value from P(¢ I T), and 
convert it back to W. Then, insert this '1f value to equation (2), and draw a 
value of f3f randomly from it. Repeat this procedure and plot all the values of 
the f3f in a histogram. Given enough repetitions, the histogram will become 
smooth and resemble a kernal density. This kernal density is the approximation 
of the distribution of f3f. Take the mean of this distribution and it should be 
the point estimate of the turnout rate by Hispanics in that precinct! 
After obtaining point estimates of parameters for each (3, I go back to the 
table at the beginning of this section and get the A's with the same method. 
From these precinct-level estimated parameters of interest, it is straightfor-
ward to calculate the parameters of interests for more aggregated level areas, 
such counties. 5 The fundamental reasoning behind this generalized method of 
5The method also applies to estimation of joint probabilities in larger than 2 by 2 con-
tingency tables. King (1997) also provides discussions on how the model works with slight 
adjustment when some of the assumptions are not met. 
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bounds is that we can borrow strength from the many precincts which may 
share a similar turnout or voting pattern. The estimation procedure is based 
on a Bayesian framework and utilizes maximum likelihood estimation exten-
sively. 
4.2 The Bay Area Phenomenon 
In Chapter 3, I studied a survey data set where individual respondents revealed 
how they voted on Proposition 187, their opinions on the economy, and other 
demographic features. A natural response to the findings there is whether 
individual level variables are enough to explain the voting behavior. Especially 
in this case, regional variation was clear and present - Proposition 187 failed 
in eight out of .58 counties in California. Moreover, as Figure 4.3 shows, all 
eight counties happen to be located in the San Francisco Bay Area! The 
8 counties are: Alameda, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, 
Santa Cruz, Sonoma, and Yolo. Except for Yolo, all the other 7 counties 
share borders with each other. This "Bay Area phenomenon" suggests that 
there might be certain regional characteristics in effect. Compared with the 
rest of California, did these 8 counties have better or worse economies at the 
time? Did they have higher or lower Hispanic population percentages? Or 
was the vote outcome simply the result of the liberal tradition of the Bay 
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Area? Understanding the reason Proposition 187 did not do well in these 8 
counties can shed some light on whether Californians perceived the issue of 
illegal immigrants economically or racially. 
4.2.1 Compositional Effects: Ethnicity and Partisan.:. 
ship 
Chapter 3 has provided almost all the possible sources of compositional effects. 
Through the individual data analysis there, we see that a few factors stand out 
as the dividing lines of preferences. Hispanic identity, ideology, partisanship, 
education level, and religious beliefs are all significant in predicting voters' 
support for Proposition 187. Naturally, I would like to control for the effects 
of all of these factors. However, the IGS data does not contain information 
about ideology, education level, or religious beliefs. So I only estimate the 
compositional effect of Hispanic ethnicity and partisanship, which in fact are 
the most important dividing lines in Proposition 187 voting. 
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Figure 4.3: The Bay Area Phenomenon on Proposition 187 Voting 
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4.2.2 Contextual Effects: Regional Economy and Eth-
nic Diversification 
The county economy. The issue of illegal immigration has often been framed as 
.. 
one wi~h economic overtones such as job competitions_or welfare magnets. For 
example, in the October 1994 Field Poll, 68.9% of those who favored Propo-
sition 187 believed that its passage meant more jobs for legal residents. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, like every time nativism surged in California, Propo-
sition 187 was proposed and passed during a time of economic distress. Yet, 
different personal financial conditions resulted in the same probability of voting 
for the Proposition. So here I would like to test if voters formed their per-
ception of economic threat upon what they observed in their residing region 
instead of what happened to themselves. 
The data analysis in last chapter has shown that voters did not form differ-
ent opinion on Proposition 187 based upon different evaluations of the state's 
economy either. So I would like to look at some level that is between state and 
personal conditions. City, County, Assembly District, or groups of counties are 
all possibilities. In light of the Bay Area phenomenon, it seems that county is 
the appropriate level. I hypothesize that the county economy is accountable 
for the different supporting rate on Proposition 187 across the counties. The 
model will test if lower income, higher unemployment rate stimulated more 
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support for this Proposition. 
In addition, I try to capture the effects of real concerns over job replace-
ment. Since most illegal immigrants are believed to take low skill, low wage 
jobs, those who .they are able to replace should be mainly the less educated 
workers. I use the percentage of each county's population who hold bachelor's 
degree or higher as an indicator for the intensity of job replacement threat 
in a county. Moreover, because of the special relationship between illegal im-
migrants and guest laborers Californian farms depend upon, the model will 
take control of counties that are agriculturally concentrated. In comparison, I 
also distinguish the counties by the size of their manufacturing industry which 
reflects the concentration of blue collar workers. 
Ethnic composition. Studies on California politics often find that ethnic 
composition mattered in vote outcomes (Cain 1992; Citrin, Reingold, and Wal-
ters 1990). Cain (1992) first mentioned the phenomenon of "new populism" 
in California. That is, as the minority population grows, more popular ini-
tiatives appear on the ballot to take advantage of direct democracy. "New 
populism" reflects the threat whites feel from the increasing political partic-
ipation by minority groups, especially in the state legislature. In the case of 
Proposition 187, Tolbert and Hero (1996) found that in bifurcated counties, 
where whites might have felt stronger threat from the Hispanics, the chances 
were better that Proposition 187, as a policy targeting minorities, passed. As-
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suming Hispanic voters everywhere voted for the proposition at the same rate, 
they concluded that the presence of large Hispanic populations in bifurcated 
counties must have caused more white voters to vote for the Proposition. 
However, it is rather restrictive to assume that Hispanic population's opin-
ion was homogeneous on Proposition 187 across counties. According to Dahl 
(1961), any minority group is highly socioeconomically heterogeneous, thus its 
members were assimulated differently by the majority group. Since we have 
reasons to believe that the voting behavior of Hispanic voters reflects their 
socioeconomic status and degree of assimilation, we cannot dismiss the possi-
bility that the Hispanic support for the Proposition was actually heterogeneous 
across counties. Thus, I will re-test the hypothesis of new populism. 
Instead of using population percentage of each minority group, I measure 
the racial/ ethnic diversification of a county with a combined index. The index 
of relative dominance of whites (RDW) is constructed in a way that accounts 
for· both size and dispersion of ethnic groups. Following Londregan, et al. 
(1995), this index is defined as follows: 
RDW= W
2 
Jw2 + H2 + A2 + B2 + 02 
where W stands for the population share of white, H for Hispanic, A for Asian, 
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B for blacks, and 0 for other groups. For each county, RDW sensitively 
reflects the relative size of white population and diffusion of ethnic groups. 
Specifically, RDW varies between 0 and 1, with larger values reflecting stronger 
dominance of the whites. Notice that it gives disproportionately more weight 
to the ethnicity of white, emphasizing its current dominant social.status. For 
example, if the white populations in two counties are both 70%, but one with 
30% Hispanic and the other with 20% Hispanic and 10% Asians, then the 
RDW score for the first county is 0.64 and the second is 0.67. In other words, 
whites are less dominant in bifurcated counties than in heterogeneous counties. 
And if a third county is 85% white and 15% Hispanic, then its RDW score is 
0.84. So this index is a consistent quantification of previous literature on that 
whites feel least threatened in homogeneous counties, and that they feel more 
threatened in bifurcated counties than heterogeneous counties. 
In summary, the following analysis will examine the contextual effects af-
ter taking control of the compositional effects. Compositional effects are what 
we found in the last chapter. That is, Hispanic voters and Democrat voters 
are expected to be less supportive than non-Hispanic and Republican voters 
respectively. Though ideology is also an important compositional effect, the 
data used in the following study does not contain information on people's ide-
ological positions. So it is not considered here. In the following section, I will 
explain how the first step of analysis will produce the estimated percentages of 
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Hispanic voters, registered Democrat voters, and registered Republican voters 
who voted for the Proposition. In the second step, I use these estimates to 
explore the effects of contextual effects. I will first examine if Hispanic support 
and partisan line were heterogeneous across counties. If so, how racial/ ethnic 
diversification and county economy explains such variations. 
4.3 A Two-Step Analysis 
Equipped with the IGS data and the generalized method of bounds, I proceed 
to do the first step estimation. As discussed earlier, the first step estimation 
is designed to isolate the effects of individual ethnic identity and partisan-
ship from contextual effects that were external to the voters. Assessing how 
Hispanic identity influenced opinions on the Proposition is accomplished by 
estimating the percentage of Hispanic voters who voted "yes" on Proposition 
187 in each county. To obtain such an estimate, I employ the generalized. 
method of bounds to generate point estimates of the percentage of Hispanics 
who voted for the Proposition in all precincts in each county and aggregate 
them to obtain the estimates for the county. 
Table 4.1 reports the estimated outcome. For comparison, Table 4.1 also 
lists the estimates generated by another method, Goodman's regression. It 
has estimated probabilities that fall beyond the boundaries of 0 and 1, making 
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the generalized method of bounds obviously a superior method. 
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Table 4.1: Estimated Percent of Hispanics Voted "Yes" on Proposition 187 at 
County Level 
ESTIMATES GENERATED BY 
COUNTY EI Goodman's Regression 
1. Alameda 40.48 82.42 
2. Alpine· 28.84 30.33 
3. Amador 70.41 183.69 
4. Butte 12.36 -96.89 
5. Calaveras 79.31 102.99 
6. Colusa 26.57 25.44 
7. Contra Costa 47.16 52.36 
8. Del Norte 18.23 5.17 
9. El Dorado 
10. Fresno 18.02 20.24 
11. Glenn 23.84 9.42 
12. Humboldt 14.09 -151.3 
13. Imperial 21.34 22.71 
14. Inyo 95.52 163.07 
15. Kern 34.55 25.13 
16. Kings 21.34 14.70 
17. Lake 43.52 187.21 
18. Lassen 
19. Los Angeles 10.68 28.80 
20. Madera 34.22 34.34 
21. Marin 81.45 148.94 
22. Mariposa 40.03 97.79 
23. Mendocino 92.48 204.98 
24. Merced 13.99 2.99 
25. Modoc 61.66 99.61 
26 .. Mono 81.92 242.32 
27. Monterey 40.53 36.71 
28. Napa 12.67 12.76 
29. Nevada 57.72 86.10 
30. Orange 18.88 29.34 
31. Placer 58.98 46.23 
32. Plumes 24.79 25.70 
33. Riverside 28.18 11.58 
34. Sacramento 10.90 -41.19 
35. San Bonito 17.09 17.58 
36. San Bernardino 30.05 18.47 
37. San Diego 9.78 28.04 
38. San Francisco 21.69 22.83 
continued on next page 
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ESTIMATES GENERATED BY 
COUNTY EI Goodman's Regression 
39. San Joaquin 11.23 -11.12 
40. San Lius Obispo 50.54 38.67 
41. San Mateo 16.91 20.06 
42. Santa Barbara 43.94 43.78 
43. Santa Clara 27.84 19.39 
44. Santa Cruz 68.96 57.25 
45. Shasta 89.13 136.77 
46. Sierra 22.40 -23.31 
47. Siskiyou 5.41 -157.51 
48. Solano 4.72 -33.01 
49. Sonoma 46.97 13.00 
50. Stanislaus 17.97 9.55 
51. Sutter 60.91 51.33 
52. Tehama 
53. Trinity 63.60 246.57 
54. Tulare 27.30 24.84 
55. Tuolumne 9.33 -87.54 
56. Ventura 37.31 35.12 
57. Yolo 62.06 48.66 
58. Yuba 13.65 53.00 
Note: 
- indicates that the data on that county is not available. See footnote 1. 
The number of Democrats and Republicans that are estimated to vote 
for the Proposition respectively are reported in Table 4.2. Note that the 
percentages estimated are the fraction of those who voted "yes" on Proposition 
187 among all of those who voted on this Proposition. 
After obtaining these results, I summarize what they tell in Figures 4.4 
through 4.6. First, compared with LAT poll, the aggregate data analysis gen-
erates similar results. The survey reported that 23.6% Hispanics voted for the 
Proposition. In Figure 4.4, most of the counties are centered around 20%. It is 
similar in the cases for Democrats and Republicans. The LAT poll has a 32% 
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Table 4.2: Estimated Percent of Republicans and Democrats Voted "Yes" on 
Proposition 187 at County Level 
PERCENT OF YES VOTE BY 
COUNTY DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS 
1. Alameda 15.85 90.55 
2. Alpine 30.50 93.26 
3. Amador 36.43 92.89 
4. Butte 24.23 93.01 
5. Calaveras 35.08 93.05 
6. Colusa 47.42 92.76 
7. Contra Costa 14.67 72.01 
8. Del Norte 23.31 85.44 
9. El Dorado 
10. Fresno 21.62 87.66 
11. Glenn 41.60 92.15 
12. Humboldt 14.36 95.68 
13. Imperial 24.24 96.17 
14. Inyo 33.36 88.71 
15. Kern 19.89 70.70 
16. Kings 22.52 90.45 
17. Lake 35.02 88.01 
18. Lassen 
19. Los Angeles 14.67 88.89 
20. Madera 34.15 90.45 
21. Marin 11.13 93.22 
22. Mariposa 35.05 98.65 
23. Mendocino 18.97 93.10 
24. Merced 25.33 96.67 
25. Modoc 32.11 92.79 
26. Mono 57.32 88.90 
27. Monterey 21.93 83.03 
28. Napa 17.52 91.12 
29. Nevada 23.37 99.77 
30. Orange 27.53 89.85 
31. Placer 24.51 89.66 
32. Plumas 40.72 92.18 
33. Riverside 15.94 76.60 
34. Sacramento 21.37 79.98 
35. San Benito 25.53 87.45 
36. San Bernardino 24.51 70.49 
37. San Diego 38.72 97.38 
38. San Francisco 13.94 73.08 
continued on the next page 
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PERCENTAGE OF YES VOTES BY 
COUNTY DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS 
39. San Joaquin 16.18 92.33 
40. San Lius Obispo 20.90 89.81 
41. San Mateo 8.90 63.37 
42. Santa Barbara 15.82 85.71 
43. Santa Clara 11.17 62.40 
44. Santa Cruz 15.75 66.60 
45. Shasta 27.68 83.40 
46. Sierra 33.58 86.09 
47. Siskiyou 42.74 88.01 
48. Solano 12.26 75.95 
49. Sonoma 15.44 70.66 
50. Stanislaus 26.94 83.87 
51. Sutter 24.29 78.11 
52. Tehama 
53. Trinity 29.13 90.5 
54. "Tulare 24.98 93.75 
55. Tuolumne 28.51 88.98 
56. Ventura 56.87 70.65 
57. Yolo 13.25 74.14 
58. Yuba 24.66 91.51 
Statewide 20.8 82.7 
Note: 
- indicates that the data on that county is not available. See footnote 1. 
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support rate for Democrats, and Figure 4.5 shows that in most counties, 10% 
to 40% Democrats supported the Proposition. The corresponding numbers for 
Republicans are 78% in LAT poll and a range of 703 to 90% in Figure 4.6. 
Such similarity offers a cross-validation to the returns in the LAT poll. 
Secondly, there are obviously a few counties that have extremely homo-
geneous support along ethnicity or partisanship. A further review of these 
outliers shows that these counties are the ones with homogeneous population 
composition. This suggests that the generalized method of bounds may not be 
at its best when dealing with extremely skewed data. Future work is called for 
to either improve the method of generalized bounds, or develop new method 
to analyze homogeneous precincts. 
Granted that the method is not extremely erroneous, we see that Hispanic 
support rate is more heterogeneous than support rate along partisan lines. 
I then analyze whether the heterogeneity in choices by Hispanic voters and 
partisan voters can be explained by the regional economic and ethnic charac-
teristics. Since this is a county level analysis comparable to Tolbert and Hero 
(1996), I first replicate their results to show that I have roughly the same data 
set as theirs. The first column of numbers in Table 4.3 is the reprint of their 
major results, and my replication is in the second column. Notice that they 
are very close, showing the same degrees of statistical significance. 
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Figure 4.4: County-Level Support for Proposition 187 by Hispanics 
15 Number of Counties 
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Table 4.3: County-Level ;Race/ethnicity Diversity and the Vote for Proposition 
187 (Replication of the Analysis by Tolbert and Hero) 
Percent of yes on 187 
Model 5 in With 
their Table 3 Replication Education 
Percent Hispanic -.15*** -.15*** 
(.05) (.05) 
Percent black .54** .62*** 
(.17) (.17) 
Percent Asian -.42*** -.49*** 
(.12) (.12) 
Unemployment rate 1.26*** 1.20*** 
(percent) (.19) (.15) 
Republican party 1.16*** 1.05*** 
(percent registered) (.08) (.08) 
Education level (percent with 
bachelor's degree or higher) 
Constant 9.93** 14.21*** 
(3.93) (3.70) 
Adjusted R2 .89 .89 
Number of Observations 58 58 
Note: 
Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. 


















Such an exercise can also demonstrate that their models are not robust. 
When I include education levels as an additional independent variable, the 
coefficients reported in the third column are vastly different. It seems the 
minority population can no longer explain the county level variation, thus 
their story is seriously questioned. 
I model the county level vote outcome as follows: 
where Y is supported by Hispanic voters, by Democrats, and by Republicans 
respectively. X1 is the index of relative dominance of whites. X 2 is a vector 
of variables about the economic characteristics in the county, including the 
percentage of total employed that are employed by the agriculture sector, the 
percentage of employed by the manufacturing sector, the unemployment rate, 
the logarithm of each county's per capita income level, and the percentage of 
the population with bachelor's degree or higher. 
Table 4.4 provides the result of the OLS regressions. The first column of 
numbers shows how contextual effects account for variation of Hispanic support 
across counties. Interesting enough, the measure of relative dominance of 
whites has a positive and significant coefficient, meaning that in counties with 
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stronger white dominance, Hispanic voters there were more likely to support 
the Proposition. 
Table 4.4: Regression Estimates on Aggregate Support by Hispanics and Par-
tisan Voters 
PERCENT OF YES VOTE BY 
Independent Variables HISPANICS DEMOCRATS REPUBLICANS 
Constant -3.85 3.55** 
(3.12) (1.26) 
Relative Dominance of 0.73*** 0.27*** 
Whites Index (0.20) (0.08) 
Agriculture Employment -0.19 0.56 
(0.72) (0.29) 
Manufacture Employment -1.32* -0.15 
(0.64) (0.26) 
Unemployment Rate 2.70 0.61 
{1.54) (0.62) 
Log (Per capita income) 36.35 39.11** 
(33. 77) (13.65) 
Education Level (Percent with 0.70 -1.21 ** 
bachelor's degree or· higher) (0.96) (0.39) 
Number of Observations 55 55 
R-squared 0.34 0.49 
Note: 
Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. 

















Also, for Hispanic support, the sizes of both the agriculture and manu-
facturing sectors in each county have negative coefficients, meaning the less 
people employed by the agriculture or manufacturing sectors, the more His-
panics voted for the Proposition. Especially for manufacturing sectors, the 
effect is statistically significant. The unemployment rate, per capita income, 
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and education level all have positive but not significant coefficients. It seems 
that for Hispanic voters, the type of the county economy mattered more than 
the performance of the county economy. Hispanics in highly agricultural con-
centrated and manufacturing concentration counties were more likely to vote 
against the Proposition. 
The second and third column shows how Democrats and Republicans were 
influenced by county characteristics. In both cases, the measurement of rel-
ative dominance of whites has a positive and significant effect. That is, in 
counties where whites were more dominant, both Democrats and Republicans 
tended to support the Proposition more than elsewhere. 
The effect of agricultural concentration is marginally significant for Democrats 
and not significant for Republicans. But they are both of positive signs, sug-
gesting ample support for the Proposition from agricultural counties. Notice 
that this is the opposite to the effect found for Hispanics. It leads one to be-
lieve that non-Hispanic .voters in agricultural counties might have voted very 
differently from Hispanic voters. It is also interesting to see that manufac-
turing sector has negative effect on both Democrats and Republicans, and 
significantly for Republicans. 
The performance of county economy has stronger effect on Democrats than 
on Republicans. The unemployment rate has positive coefficients in both cases, 
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though not significantly, meaning that higher unemployment generated more 
support for the Proposition. For Democrats, higher per capita income is cor-
related with more support, and more better educated neighbors is correlated 
with less support for the Proposition. The signs are the opposite for Republi-
cans, hµt not significant. 
The overall pattern seems to contradict the hypothesis of "new populism." 
Controlling other effects, we see counties which score higher on the index of rel-
ative dominance of whites have stronger support for the Proposition. In other 
words, in places where whites actually dominate the total population, they are 
more likely to back up a policy that restricts the inflow of illegal immigrants. 
Such finding is completely opposite to that of Tolbert and Hero's (1996). 
Comparing what correlates with the variation in choices by Democrats and 
Republicans, the results show two different pictures. For Democrats, county's 
economy can explain as much variation as county's racial/ ethnic composition. 
Specifically, whe.n a county has more richer people but fewer better-educated 
people, more Democrats tend to vote for the Proposition. While for Republi-
cans, racial/ethnic composition overwhelms the economic condition. 
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4.4 Ethnic Distance, Party, and Economy in 
Proposition 187 Voting 
Combining the findings in Chapter 3 and 4, I reconstruct Proposition 187 
voting in the following way. First, it was an issue involving racial/ethnic sen-
timent and ideological standing when put on the ballot. Second, the parties 
heavily politicized it during the election. And last, economic concerns out-
weighed ideological standings for many Democrats, who defected to vote for 
the Proposition. 
4.4.1 Direct Democracy and Party Influence 
The significance of partisanship demonstrated in the study implies that Propo-
sition 187 was an issue heavily politicized by the parties. Previous research 
(Magleby 1985) suggested that parties stayed rather·detached from ballot is-
sues for fear of alienating voters. What we have seen here, however, shows 
that parties do not necessarily avoid taking stands on certain ballot issues and 
may even want to transform some salient ones into their campaign issues. This 
certainly conforms to the trend in California referenda voting in the recent his-
tory. From the "tax revolt," "English Only," to the "Abolition of Affirmative 
Action," each party and all party candidates - gubernatorial, congressional, 
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and presidential - took clear standings on whether they support or oppose the 
propositions. 
On the voters' side, the parties' heavy involvement may have introduced to 
them an information short cut. Propositions are often difficult to comprehend. 
A proposition is about one single issue, which may be of remote interest or rel-
evance to a voter. If a party or its candidate whom the voters likes talks about 
the proposition and suggests which way she should vote on the Proposition, 
it is certainly useful information to her. Given that ordinary citizens do not 
and probably can not afford to listen and weigh each side of the argument as 
thoroughly as professional legislators do, they would probably overweigh the 
side of argument from their favored parties and politicians. 
In a way, proposition voting in California has become a unique combination 
of civil movements and party politics. On one hand, California has a rich his-
tory ·of employing civil authority to impose the will of majority groups. With 
the·tradition of the west, government was newer and weaker here compared to 
eastern states. Historically, people came to California to make a quick fortune, 
and for that it is most efficient to mend laws as needed. Direct democracy is 
widely used in California, especially on issues that appear to strengthen the 
benefits of the majority. Consequentially, political opportunism has found its 
way to rise in California politics. Pete Wilson's using of Proposition 187 was 
a vivid example. 
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On the other hand, political opportunism has facilitated participation in 
referenda voting. Proposing and publicizing ballot initiatives are costly, and 
can use some help from organized political activists and channels like parties. 
In the case of Proposition 187, the California Republican Party helped mail 
out 200,000 petition letters to solicit enough signat:ures to put th~ Proposition 
on the ballot. Moreover, having party candidates or prominent politicians 
endorsing ballot initiatives sends clear information to voters as which party 
is taking a more pro stand. After all, party affiliation is a key factor in most 
elections. Support or objection by a party on initiatives provides a reference 
point to most voters. 
This combination of party politics and direct democracy has certainly di-
luted the issue in question with a systematic and ideological influence. In 
this study, this :;>ystematic influence is effectively captured in the LAT survey 
analysis and is controlled for in the aggregate data analysis. After separating 
this systematic effect, I was able to show whether pocket book politics was 
in effect in Proposition 187 voting. County income and education level had 
much to do with the Proposition's appeal to Democrat voters. This suggests 
that interest conflict resulted in different degrees of concern to different types 
of voters. Partisanship, as well as other factors depending on the issue, can 
determine whether the dimension of economic competition becomes involved 
in the decision making process. 
∏4
Although Proposition 1⅛7 serves as a perfect case study on the inter-group 
relations between native residents and new (illegal) immigrants, the opinion 
seems to have been heavily influence by campaign effects due to its involvement 
in the gubernatorial election. It would be more interesting to see how native 
residents perceived the issue of immigration and immigrants in absence of 
politicization.
The data analysis in the following chapters will provide a good chance to 
look at public opinion in absence of political events. In comparison, I would 
expect people to consider the issue more on the issue itself, revealing their 
concerns on economic competition and/or traces of racial prejudice. It is also 
natural to expect people to have somewhat less information on the issue, so 
as to show uncertainty in their opinion. With heteroskedastic discrete choice 
models, I will examine the dispersion, in addition to the position, of opinion.
4.4.2 A Note on Methodology
The aggregate data analysis in this chapter shows the benefits and problems 
of generalized method of bounds. Overall, generalized method of bounds pro­
duced results consistent with survey returns, cross-validating the findings and 
inferences. We see that it produced much better results than traditional meth­
ods such as Goodman's regression. It is safe to say that it provides better
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estimation than any alternative method. 
However, it is also important to note its inability in dealing with skewed 
distributions. In counties when the numbers of Hispanics are really small, 
the method tends to overestimate the joint probability of being Hispanic and 
voting for Proposition 187. It seems that the method works best with data 
from bifurcated populations. In other words, its performance is dependent 
upon the range of bounds. When with small number of Hispanics, the possible 
support rate could be ranging from 0% to 100%. While if Hispanics and non-
Hispanics split the population, with the exception of having an exact 50% 
total support rate, the bounds for either group can be narrowed down. 
Since the generalized method of bounds builds its foundation on the "bounds," 
its limitation is inevitable when the bounds are not informative. Besides calling 
for improvement upon the method, I would like to point out another alterna-
tive. Stepping back a little, we can see the need for methods that can estimate 
jointly probabilities was driven by the lack of homogeneous regions. Now that 
we have developed methods to do so, we find that a very good one of them can-
not handle homogeneous regions well. Then it is perhaps time to look at the 
old way of doing research again.· If a region contains a really small number of 
minorities, we have the following options. First is to consider whether it is the 
majority or the minority in the region that we are more interested in studying. 
If we are more interested in the majority since they shape the regional politics, 
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then we can assume that the minority is missing in the total outcome. After 
all, rational choice theory predicts that the minority will not bear the cost 
of participation if they know their small number cannot make a difference in 
the outcome. Alternatively, we can go out and do an old-fashioned field work. 
That is., we can try to sample the minorities and obtain their preferences. 
Due to the scope of this study, I will not try these alternatives. Instead, I 
present the performance of generalized method of bounds, providing a bench-
mark for further application of the method. 
4.4.3 Distances and Perceptions 
The most salient characteristics of the voting on Proposition 187 was the gap 
between Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters. The LAT survey revealed it first 
and was further exposed in the context of county wide racial/ethnic composi-
tion. In countie~ where whites are the dominant majority of the population, 
both Democrats and Republicans were more likely to support the Proposi-
tion. This implies that people who were physically more distant from ethnic 
minorities perceived the threat of illegal immigrants as more serious. If we 
assume that their perception is less fact-based than the perceptions of those 
who lived more closely to Hispanics, then what this reflects is that physical 
distance correlates with projected fear or resentment. 
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This helps to explain the Bay Area Phenomenon. The 8 counties who 
failed Proposition 187 all had high concentration of ethnic minority residents. 
Meanwhile, one could feel less surprised by the fact that the author of H.R. 
2202, Senator Alan Simpson, was from Wyoming. Wyoming has been the state 
with fewest legal immigrants settled in decades, and where the percentage of 
white population is as high as 94% according to the 1990 census. 
It is important to understand the correlation between physical distance and 
psychological distance as the two reinforce each other. Physical distance would 
probably cause less information exchange between different racial groups, giv-
ing the elites' stories, such as an "invasion" by immigrants, better receptions. 
Meanwhile, psychological distance may be the motivation for people to be 
physically distant. As numerous studies on racial attitude have shown, an 
important element that prevents complete racial aggregation is whites' belief 
that they have certain beliefs and values that blacks do not possess. 
So in the following chapters, I start to explore the effects of racial distance, 
both physical and psychological. In Chapter 5, I use a national opinion poll 
on immigration reform to let the sample go beyond California. Immigration 
issue is understandably a big topic in California, as it attracts about one 
fourth of total immigrants annually in the 1990's. But for the vast central 
and midwest states, immigrants are people they hear rather than they see. So 
for people in places like Wyoming, what would be the factors that determine 
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their perception on immigrants and preferences on immigration policies? I 
hypothesize that the traditional beliefs may help. As a country established by 
immigrants, individualism and egalitarianism are deep-rooted beliefs that give 
meaning to the phrase "American Dream." 
In Chapter 6, I complete my inquiry on the topic" with an analysis on 
African American's view on immigration issues. In many ways, African Amer-
icans are at the intersection of native residents and new immigrants. They 
have been the political allies of Hispanic and Asian Americans, and also are 
positioned in the direct impact zone in terms of job, housing, and school-
ing competition. They behaved differently than whites on Proposition 187, 
with 57%6 of them rejecting it. With an opinion poll conducted in the city 
of Los Angeles, I study how African-Americans perceived the impact of the 
increasing Hispanic population. Compared with whites' view on Hispanics, 
their attitude should reflect some "realistic" expectations, which may not be 
the precise impressions, from the close contact. 
6 See Table 3.1. 
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Chapter 5 
TRADITIONS AND NEWCOMERS 
As America changes its immigration policy, immigrants are perceived as a 
group of people with distinct characteristics. For example, they do not speak 
English well, they are poorer, and they have different views on life and val-
ues. Yet, these perceived group characteristics are not necessarily objective or 
agreed upon universally. According to anti-immigration activists, immigrants 
are job thieves. According to immigration advocators, immigrants are vital 
to keep the economy going. Even among economists, proponents of each side 
disagree on almost every statistic. It is quite obvious that the perception of the 
effect of immigrants varies drastically, which leads to possibly very contrasting 
views on the whole issue of immigration policy. 
The previous chapter probed the question of perceptions about immigra-
tion. Popular opinion was found to be influenced by elite and political cam-
paigns, especially during elections. In addition, predominantly white regions 
had less favorable views on immigration issues. Partisanship and type of econ-
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omy in a region could also jointly affect preferences on immigration policy. 
In general, while racial distance has a clear dividing effect, all the evidence 
suggests that political predisposition is closely related to the perception of 
immigrants as an "alien" group. 
In this chapter, I focus on explaining Americans' perceptions of immigrants 
and the immigration issue with the key characteristics that are supposed to 
distinguish these opinion holders from the newcomers - the traditional Amer-
ican values. I use a nationwide survey and explore the relative explanatory 
power of personal beliefs and economic evaluations on people's opinion on 
immigration issues. I find that personal beliefs like egalitarianism and indi-
vidualism were highly effective in shaping one's view on the economic impact 
that immigrants caused .. Much of the sentiment for more strict immigration 
policies also could be explained by one's core beliefs. Economic concerns exert 
different patterns of effects, showing their influence primarily through policy 
preferences instead of on immigrants. 
5.1 Information and Uncertainty 
Compared with previous chapters, the analysis in this chapter seeks a more 
general result by using an opinion survey that was not influenced by issue 
campaigns. The data used in this study is from the American National Elec-
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tion Study, 1992: Pre- and Post-Election Survey. The total sample size is 
2485. This survey was conducted at a time when the issue of immigration 
just started to rise to prominence on the political agenda in the United States. 
States with high concentrations of immigrants, such as California, New York, 
·and Florida, were voicing their concern on state expenditures on immigrants. 
Individuals were concerned about the cost and benefits of "multiculturalism." 
This 1992 survey reflects this political environment by asking questions per-
taining to opinions on multiculturalism and immigration. Since we know that 
the opinion on Proposition 187 was strongly affected by party politics and elec-
tion campaigns, it is interesting to compare the opinion on the immigration 
issue in the absence of strong information from campaigns. Specifically, I test 
if people show any uncertainty in their views of immigrants and immigration 
policies. 
Uncertainty is often caused by lack of information. Though immigration 
issues have gained national media attention, they still are not a top priority 
in most states. New immigrants tend to settle in metropolitan areas and the 
vast central and Midwest states have not experienced much of an inflow of 
immigrants. For example, accor~ing to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS), from 1992 to 1994 about 80% of new immigrant every year 
settled in 10 states, 1 which means the other 40 states received on average 
1These top 10 states are: California, New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Washington, Pennsylvania, Maryland. 
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some 0.5% of new immigrants.2 Further, this pattern of settlement is very 
stable over time - those who have had more immigrants continue to attract 
more new immigrants, and those who had fewer, get fewer. So I suspect that 
most people in most of the states have no experience of being suddenly :flooded 
by foreign immigrants, and thus have less first-hand information on the reasons 
and directions of immigration reform. 
Further, even in those states traditionally receiving large numbers of im-
migrants, political campaigns make big differences. Assuming that it is costly 
to obtain information, organized political activities reduce that cost. Imagine 
sitting in one's own living room and watching Wilson's TV campaign adver-
tisement showing road sign near the border of San Diego and Mexico - a 
picture warning motorists that there might be people and children coming out 
of nowhere and running across the highway suddenly. One would probably 
feel "informed" that the problem of illegal immigrants was getting out of con-
trol. As many scholars have found, campaigns through modern media can 
significantly increase the awareness of certain issues. 
In the following analysis, I will use a measurement of how informed one is to 
control for systematic variation in people's opinion. To measure how well one 
is informed, I use an individual's answers to six questions on political facts to 
2In fact, according to the INS, the bottom 30 states received on average about 0.253 of 
total immigrants every year from 1992 to 1994. 
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construct a variable called "knowledge" (see Table 5.1). Four of the questions 
ask the respondents to name what offices Quayle, Rehnquist, Yeltsin, and Foley 
held respectively. The other two questions ask the respondents to name "who 
decides consitutionality of a law" and "who nominates the Supreme Court 
judge" respectively. The level of difficulty of these questions was negatively 
correlated with the number of people who answered them correctly. I use a 
factor analysis to derive the commonality weight assigned to each answer. For 
each individual, the value of "knowledge" is the sum of the commonality values 
of the questions that he answers correctly. 
5.2 Prejudice and Preferences 
Immigration issues can certainly bring up a sense of economic competition 
between natives and immigrants. As Hoskin (1991) argues, immigration is 
an economic phenomenon. Immigrants are often motivated to come to the 
host cquntry by personal economic fortune, as in the case of Turkish labor-
ers in Germany and Mexicans crossing the Rio Grande. However, whenever 
the economy slows in the host country, which is often accompanied by rising 
unemployment, immigrants often become the scapegoats. 
Being a scapegoat is different from being at fault. At least, none of the 
economists who have been presidents of the American Economic Association or 
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members of the President's Council of Economic Advisors gave a negative eval-
uation to the effect of immigration on the nation's economy in the twentieth 
century (Simon 1989). Political scientists, on the other hand, have often found 
the cause of anti-immigrant sentiment to be something other than economic 
difficulty. For example, Legge (1996) showed that German's anti-foreign sen-
timent was better measu-red by their sense of German identity rather than by 
their satisfaction with personal economic conditions. Hood and Morris (1997) 
found that white Americans' opinion on immigration in 1990's had prominent 
racial and ethnic components. As I found in Chapter 4, they find that whites 
living in close proximity to minorities are more likely to favor increased immi-
gration. In almost every study of public opinion on immigration, the opinion 
gap between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is clear and present (Alvarez and 
Butterfield 1997; Binder et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997). 
This is reminiscent of the research findings on many racial issues, such 
as busing or welfare policies. Naturally, it looks like that prejudice may be 
the motivation of the anti-immigration sentiment. To test whether personal 
prejudice has shaped one's view on immigration issues, I use the very definition 
of symbolic racism to measure the presence its effects. Specifically, I use an 
independent variable that represents people's anti-minority affect and a set 
of independent variables that measure the degree of beliefs in American core 
values of individualism and egalitarianism. 
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As seen in Table 5.1, the measurement of anti-minority affect is based on 
one's view of minorities' traits. The answers are of the form "Where would you 
rate people of X race on this 7-point scale?" For example, 1 stands for hard-
working and 7 for lazy. Other traits include unintelligent to intelligent, and 
violent to peaceful. The three types of questions are asked of black~, Hispanics, 
and Asians respectively. My coding makes higher values indicate more negative 
stereotypes. Again, I conduct a factor analysis to obtain the appropriate 
weight for each answer. For each individual, multiplying the commonality 
value with its corresponding answer and then summing the nine products 
generates the scale for anti-minority affect. 
Notice that these questions are not the typical ones used by symbolic racism 
theorists listed in Chapter 2. However, I believe that they can effectively mea-
sure one's affect. toward minorities and have fewer problems of endogeneity. 
The standard questions of one's feelings toward black's "pushiness" or govern-
ment's special favors to minorities only capture the results, not the sources. 
One of Sniderman and Tetlock's main objections to the symbolic racism con-
cept was that proponents of symbolic racism often use policy preferences as 
independent variables in models that purport to explain policy choices as de-
pendent variables (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). 
Incidentally, both individualism and egalitarianism have much to do with 
the history of immigrants coming to this continent and building up this coun-
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try. Both concepts were put forward by European philosophers during the 
Enlightenment but were repressed by European monarchies at the time. The 
early immigrants to America included a large number of people who were 
heavily influenced by the new thinking in the Enlightenment and were fleeing 
their repressive government in Europe to pursue freedom. Reflected in the. 
writings of the founding fathers, and reinforced in the extraordinary endeav-
.ors of building a new homeland, individualism and egalitarianism have been 
the core values of American identity. In many ways, the so-called "American 
Dream" is a vivid summary of the values. Americans have admired those who 
came to the country with nothing and then built personal successes with their 
bare hands, and have believed that everyone has an equal chance to fulfill his 
ambition in this country. 
Yet every time when nativism surges, it seems the ·perception of the new-
comers is that "[t]he immigrants who came in the past were good folks, but 
the people who are coming now are scum" (R. Simon 1985, 66). Opinion 
· polls show that many older residents worry that illegal immigrants are taking 
more from the system than they contribute. For example, a 1986 poll showed 
that 47% of respondents felt that "most of the immigrants wind up on wel-
fare" (New York Times, July 14, 1986). So if individualism as a traditional 
value helps Anglos rationalize prejudice against blacks, it is certainly useful 
in helping individuals justify their "dislike" of new, predominantly Hispanic, 
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immigrants. 
Accordingly, egalitarianism should work against anti-immigration policy 
preferences. As many works have pointed out, egalitarianism is a core value 
of American society that generates sympathetic views towards those who have 
been deprived of equal rights or opportunities. For example, egalitarianism 
has a positive effect on welfare policies, as found by Gilens (1995). From the 
perspective of egalitarianism, newcomers deserve an equal opportunity in this 
land of dreams.3 
However, egalitarianism is a concept that include many "equalities." Rae 
et al. (1981) differentiated egalitarianism to three "subtypes" - equality of 
condition, equality of means, and equality of outcomes (p. 144). Their work 
pointed out that different subtypes may have different effects on issues, though 
with overlaps. Due to lack of a priori, I do not exclude any subtype as the 
source of explanation for liberal immigration policies. 
The scales for individualism and egalitarianism are constructed as follows. I 
identified two questions that asked the respondent to pick which one out of two 
qualities is more important to teach their children. One is to choose between 
independence and respect for elders, and the other is between obedience and 
3Before 1996, the United States used a system called "amnesty" to grant illegal immi-
grants legal status. As long as an illegal immigrant can show that he has good morality 
(i.e., has not been convicted of any crime) and physical presence since certain years back, 
they can obtain legal status. So there has been a tradition of establishment first and legal 
status second. 
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self-reliance. The higher the value, the more individualistic one is. The factor 
analysis generates the commonality values which are used to weigh the answers. 
The scale is obtained from the sum of products. 
The scale for Egalitarianism is based on six questions. All of the answers to 
the questions are of the form "How much you agree or disagree with X?" They 
are coded from 1 to 5 as from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly." The 
questions are mainly about the equality problem in society as listed in Table 
5.1. The higher the value, the more egalitarian the respondent is. Similarly 
to the way the individualism scale is constructed, I also obtain a scale that 
measures egalitarianism.4 
5.3 Beliefs and Ambivalence 
A more interesting phenomenon arises when both individualism and egalitar-
ianism are included in the model -· ambivalence. Ambivalence is caused by 
conflicting values or beliefs. If people are rational, then everyone needs some 
"axioms" to operate. For example, a study by Alvarez and Brehm (1995) pre-
sented a good example of ambivalence in opinion - abortion. Many people 
4Notice that in Table 5.1, the first and fourth question on egalitarianism mentioned either 
"opportunity" or "chance" and have similar commonality scores. This suggests that these 
two questions probably referred to "equality in means" while all of the other questions are 
all quite general. But since the commonality scores across all six questions do not differ 
very much, I use them all to index the concept of egalitarianism. 
129 
Table 5.1: Commonality from Factor Analysis 
Variable 
Anti-Minority Affect 
Work ethics of Blacks 
Work ethics of Asians 
Wrok ethics of Hispanics 
Intelligence of Blacks 
Intelligence of Asians 
Intelligence of Hispanics 
Violence tendency by Blacks 
Violence tendency by Asians 
Violence tendency by Hispanics 
Individualism 
Children's quality - Independence 
Children's quality - Self-reliance 
Egalitarianism 
Society should see that everyone has equal opportunity to success 
Society has gone too far in pushing for equal rights 
We should worry less about equality 
It is not a problem someone have more of a chance in life 
There will be fewer problems if people are more equal 






Who decides constitutionality of a law 
Who nominates supreme court judge 

























believe as a primary principle that we should not kill innocent lives, including 
unborn lives. But many of these people also believe in women's right to choose. 
So for these people, their internal beliefs were pulling in opposite directions. 
Scholars have found individualism and egalitarianism to generate conflict-
ing views on welfare and racial policies (Alvarez and Brehm 1997). As men-
tioned earlier, immigration is closely linked to welfare and racial issues. So 
here I would consider the possible ambivalence caused by individualism and 
egalitarianism on the policy preferences. Specifically, if one ties immigrants to 
welfare recipients, then individualism may work against the preference for in-
creased immigration. On the other hand, egalitarianism would probably urge 
one to consider giving newcomers help getting started. 
I use the differences between one's degree of belief in individualism and egal-
itarianism as the measure of ambivalence. Ambivalence represents systematic 
dispersion around the expected opinion, similar to the effect of uncertainty. 
Compared with the random dispersion assumed in standard discrete choice 
models, this systematic dispersion calls for a heteroskedastic model to correct 
it, which I will discuss later. 
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5.4 Modeling Choices and Variations 
I use the answers to six questions as the dependent variables. The first two 
questions are about policy preferences and the other four are about perceptions 
on the impact of new immigrants. The first question asks if the respondent 
thinks the number of immigrants permitted in to the United States in the fu-
ture should "decrease a lot," "decrease a little," "increase a little," or "increase 
a lot." The second asks if new immigrants should have access to welfare imme-
diately upon arrival or have to wait for a year or longer. On both questions, 
the higher the values, the more restrictive policies the individual prefers. 
The other four questions ask how likely it is that Hispanic and Asian im-
migrants have increased job competition respectively, and how likely it is that 
they have caused higher taxes respectively. The respondents answered "not 
at all likely," "somewhat likely," "very likely," or "extremely likely," indicated 
by 1 to 4. On all four questions, higher values indicate more negative impact 
caused by immigr.ants. 
Figure 5.1 shows the distributions of the six dependent variables. Obvi-
ously, the opinion is skewed toward decreased immigration. To moderate the 
effect, I combined the answers of "increase a lot" and "increase a little" to one 
category. Opinions on the impact caused by immigrants are distributed more 
evenly across categories. 
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Figure 5.1: The Distribution of Dependent Variables 
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Having two types of questions as dependent variables can help detect any 
variation in opinion formation. Policy preference is highly subjective, with 
much leeway for personal idiosyncrasies. Perception on an economic phe-
nomenon, however, could be more objective. Individuals could form such 
·perceptions based upon media reports or personal experience, which we as-
sume to be more concrete. However, personal prejudice can be involved in 
interpreting the observed events, and may result in perceptions that are quite 
distorted from reality. 
Besides the three independent variables measuring symbolic prejudice, an-
other independent variable I use is ideology, which is shown in the case of 
Proposition 187 to be a significant factor in opinion formation. The spatial 
model also attributes the preferences on political issues mainly to ideological 
standings, arguing that it serves as a simple but consistent decision rule for 
most people when obtaining detailed information on every issue is infeasible. 
Thus I include it in my model as a control variable. 
The degree of economic satisfaction is measured by the answers to three 
questions asking the respondents to evaluate changes in the national economy, 
personal financial condition in the past year, and expected change in the future 
year. All of the answers are 5 point scales representing "much better off," 
"somewhat better off," "the same" to "somewhat worse off'' and "much worse 
off." They are coded such that a higher score indicates being better off. 
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For better comparison and interpretation, all independent variables are 
rescaled to between 0 and 1. 
With these variables defined and constructed, I proceed to analyze the indi-
viduals' opinions on six different aspects of immigration. Since I have multiple 
dependent variables to study, I have to be careful to model them correctly. No-
tice that there is only one dichotomous choice - whether immigrants should 
have welfare access immediately upon arrival or wait for a while. For this 
choice, I use a heteroskedastic logit model to study this choice. For the other 
choices, heteroskedastic ordered logit is used since these are ordered responses. 
The difference between heteroskedastic logit and the standard logit is in the 
modeling of the variance. The standard logit assumes that the variance of the 
choice function is constant, and can be standardized to 1. Heteroskedastic logit 
allows the choice to be heterogeneous and parameterizes the variance, var(c:i), 





- exp(Zn) ' 
where c:,...., A. 
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This leads to a variation on the usual logit log-likelihood: 
where A(.) indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function. 
Here the Z vector includes two variables: "knowledge" and the absolute 
differences between egalitarianism and individualism scores.5 
The heteroskedastic logit models test the following hypotheses. First, anti-
minority affect and individualism are expected to have positive effects on sup-
porting more restrictive immigration policies and having more negative views 
on immigrants. Egalitarianism is expected to have the opposite effect. Second, 
economic dissatisfaction is expected to be associated with support on mote re-
strictive immigration policies and more negative views on immigrants. And 
last, individual choices vary systematically with uncertainty and ambivalence 
which can be captured by political knowledge and the conflicting values of 
individualism and egalitarianism. 
5 Theoretically, Z and X should be independent. The model specification here points 
out the possibility that the absolute differences between egalitarianism and individualism 
scores in Z may be correlated with the two variables in the X. However, the collinearity 
is not very strong, and the X and Z matrixes remained full rank to generate estimates. 
As I will discuss later, the Z is dropped due to the absence of heteroskedasticity. So the 
estimation reported in later chapters is obtained with the standard logit model, and is free 
of any possible bias that may be caused by the correlation mentioned here. 
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5.5 Estimation Results 
Table 5.2 lists the results of the logit and ordered logit analyses on the two 
policy questions. It gives estimates of model coefficients, t-statistics, and x2 
values for the general goodness of fit. Though the x2 values show that the 
models all fit well, both heteroskedasticity tests failed to be statistically sig-
nificant. So I ran the Model H's for each dependent variable to correct for 
any bias or inefficiency the mis-specified variances could have caused. The 
following discussions are based on the coefficients obtained in the Model H's 
where variances are assumed to be constant. 
To account for the probability one prefers fewer immigrants in the future, 
anti-minority affect, egalitarianism, and retrospective and prospective personal 
financial situations all have significant effects. The positive effect is from anti-
minority affect, and the negative effect is from egalitarianism, as hypothesized. 
Surprisingly, a more individualistic person does not mind more immigrants 
than a less individualistic person does. As for the economic evaluations, we 
see that a person who was worse off in the past year supports having fewer 
immigrants, and so does someone who expects to be better off in the future.6 
A positive assessment on the national economy also indicates preferences for 
fewer immigrants. 
6Past personal finance condition and future personal finance condition are not highly 
correlated. Their correlation is 0.133 and covariance 0.008. 
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Table 5.2: Heteroskedastic Logit and Logit Estimates 
On two policy preference questions, 1992 NES Survey 
Amount Welfare Access 
(decrease) (delayed) 
Variables Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Choice 
Constant 5.72* 5.74* 4.09* 4.10* 
(9.84) (14.79) (2.32) (7.98) 
Anti-Minority Affect 2.50* 2.50* 1.60* 1.60* 
(5.28) (5.62) (2.06) (2.79) 
Individualism -0.25 -0.25 -0.37 -0.35 
(-1.69) (-1.72) (-1.45) (-1.84) 
Egalitarianism -1.17* -1.17* -1.49 - 1.73* 
(-4.01) (-4.20) (-1.08) (-4.55) 
Ideology 0.38 0.34 -0.27 -0.22 
(1.38) (1.38) (-0.76) (-0.67) 
Past personal finance -0.24 -0.24 0.46 0.44 
(-1.16) (-1.17) (1.36) (1.51) 
Future personal finance 0.74* 0.74* -1.03* -0.95* 
(2.73) (2.87) (-2.41) (-2.78) 
National economy -0.80* -0.80* -0.90 -0.80 
(-2.51) (-2.57) (-1.55) (-1.76) 
Variance 
Knowledge -0.01 0.33 
(0.06) (1.54) 
I In. - Eg. I 0.00 -0.37 
(0.00) (-0.43) 
Number of observations 1233 1233 1211 1211 
x2 92.84* 94.08* 62.61 * 60.29* 
Het. test 0.01 2.32 
*: p < .05 
It is ordered logit applied to dependent variable "amount." 
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For the policy preference on delaying welfare access for immigrants, we 
see that anti-minority affect significantly increases the chances one supports 
delayed welfare access, while egalitarianism has the opposite effect. Again, 
individualism has the same sign as egalitarianism, indicating objection to de-
layed welfare access. This is accompanied by a change of sign for the effect 
of ideology. It seems liberals tend to slightly favor delayed welfare access, in 
· contrast to their support for more immigration. 
Among the economic factors, only the prospective personal financial con-
dition has a significant effect, showing that a person who expects to be better 
off in the future opposes delayed welfare access for immigrants. Notice this 
is completely opposite of the effect of this variable on the first policy prefer-
ence. Interestingly enough, the retrospective personal financial condition also 
reversed its effect too, though not significantly, suggesting that someone who 
has been worse off does not support denying immediate welfare access. 
The effect of the evaluation of the national economy is no longer significant 
on this issue, but has the same sign as in the first policy choice. Evidence 
from both choices show that anti-minority affect is highly relevant to people's 
opinion on immigration policies. A racist attitude results in an anti-immigrant 
attitude in general. Egalitarianism generates the opposite effect, leading to less 
anti-immigrant choices. 
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· Table 5.3: Ordered Logit Estimates On the Impact by Specific Immigrant 
Groups 
1992 NES Survey 
Job Replacement by Higher Tax for 
Variables Hispanics Asian Hispanics Asian 
Choice 
Constant 0.95* -0.07 0.52 -0.37 
(2.86) (-0.21) (1.48) (-1.04) 
Anti-Minority affect 2.73* 2.06* 2.80* 2.64* 
(6.45) ( 4.99) (6.41) (6.04) 
Individualism -0.95* -0.61 * -0.56* - 0.71 * 
(-6.50) (-4.26) (-3.82) (-4.85) 
Egalitarianism -1.11 * -0.54* -0.99* - 0.73* 
(-4.26) (-2.11) (-3.66) (-2.69) 
Ideology -0.47 -0.15 0.77* -0.17 
(-1.93) (-0.62) (3.10) (-0.69) 
Past personal finance -0.28 -0.31 -0.18 -0.43* 
(-1.38) (-1.53) (-0.87) (1.99) 
Future personal finance 0.42 0.47 0.18 0.39 
(-1.67) (1.91) (0.72) (1.54) 
National economy -0.23 0.08 -0.51 0.41 
(0.74) (0.27) (-1.61) (1.31) 
Number of observations 1253 1253 1251 1251 
x2 123.87* 59.59* 123.20* 93.12* 
*: p < .05 
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I applied the same model to the other four dependent variables and found 
no heteroskedasticity as well. So Table 5.3 shows the results of standard 
ordered logit models. The table entries are estimated coefficients, with t-
statistics in parenthesis, and x2 values for the goodness of fit. Across questions, 
anti-minority affect, individualism, and egalitarianism are the only variables 
that have consistent and significant effects. The following discussion further 
examines each question. 
On job replacement. The experience of economic satisfaction does not seem 
to be highly associated with people's opinion on how likely immigrants will 
take employment opportunities from natives. The only influential factors seem 
to be anti-minority affect, individualism, and egalitarianism. It is rather inter-
esting to see that those holding more individualistic attitudes usually blame 
immigrants less for job replacement, as does a more conservative person. The 
latter finding to a degree contradicts party stands on the immigration issue. 
The Republican.Party is the one which promotes anti-immigration legislation, 
but it is also the party which consists of more conservative people. This may 
suggest that the Republican Party's anti-immigration platform could have at-
tracted traditionally non-Republican votes. 
On raising taxes. The responses on this question differs considerably de-
pending on whether it focuses on Hispanic or Asian immigrants. As before, 
anti-minority affect, individualism, and egalitarianism all have significant ef-
141 
feet upon both racial groups. The difference lies in the role of ideology and 
past personal financial condition. Being ideologically conservative significantly 
raises the probability that one thinks that Hispanic immigrants have caused 
higher taxes. However, when considering Asian immigrants, the effect of ideol-
ogy is the same as in the last model. That is, a more conservative person tends 
to disagree that Asian immigrants have caused higher taxes. In comparison, 
the opinion that Asian immigrants have increased taxes is strongly motivated 
by misfortune in one's personal financial condition. 
The results of the logit and ordered logit models allow only for rough 
comparison of the effect of personal beliefs and personal economic satisfaction. 
In the following section I compute the magnitude of the estimated effect and 
present them in Tables 5.4. 
To compute the magnitude of estimated effect, I first set all the independent 
variables to the sample mean value. With these values and the estimated 
coefficients, I can determine the probability that a hypothetical respondent 
would give a particular answer to a survey question. Then for each variable, I 
hold the values of all other independent variables constant, and calculate the 
probability of the choice function when this variable is 0 and when it is 1. The 
difference between the two probabilities is the maximum effect of the variable 
on each choice, which I use here. 
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Table 5.4: The Significant Independent Variables and Their Maximum Effect 
on Each of the Six Dependent Variables 
Independent Job Replacement by Raising Taxes for 
Variable Amount Welfare Hispanics Asians Hispanics Asians 
Anti-Minority Affect .526 .541 .369 .297 .424 .253 
Egalitarianism -.272 -.181 -.155 -.079 -.157 -.066 
Individualism -.112 -.082 -.079 -.056 
Ideology .111 
Retrospective -.055 
Prospective .187 -.109 
National Econ. .066 
In Table 5.4, I list the prejudice variables on the top part and economic 
satisfaction on the bottom part, with the magnitude of their effect on the 
choices that are anti-immigration. First of all, there is strong evidence that 
anti-minority affect is the predominant determinant of public opinion on immi-
gration policy. Next to it is the effect of egalitarianism. Overall, the magnitude 
of effect of economic variables is much smaller than that of the belief variables. 
5.5.1 Immigrants and Immigration 
The stories in the first two columns and the next four columns in Table 5.4 
contrast each other. The first two columns link economic concerns with opin-
143 
ions on immigration policies, while the next four columns suggest that values 
and prejudice were shaping people's perceptions on immigrants. 
Let us look at the impact of immigrants on the economy first. There 
is limited effect of economic (dis )satisfaction. The only clear evidern;e that 
people's opinions ate distinguishable by their past personal fortune is on the 
question of whether Asian immigrants have caused higher taxes. Those who 
have been worse off in the past believe that Asian immigrants have caused the 
taxes to rise. It is not clear to me why this is the case, but notice that the 
magnitude is quite small. 
In comparison, the issue of immigrants driving up taxes is more contextual 
than the issue of job replacement. It appears that people have more fixed 
ideas on the latter, and that economic satisfaction is not quite relevant. It is 
an opinion that invokes only the prejudice and belief variables. If we assume 
these prejudice and beliefs are formed in the early process of socialization, then 
opinions on job replacement are pretty much settled. Those who are more 
· racist are more likely to think of Hispanic and Asian immigrants as the cause 
of unemployment among older residents. Those who are more individualistic 
tend to think that there are reasons other than immigrants that caused older 
residents to lose jobs. A more egalitarian person also believes in less likelihood 
of job replacement caused by immigrants. In other words, a person who is 
more individualistic or egalitarian basically believes that new immigrants do 
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not cause rising unemployment among older residents, and this opinion does 
not vary with the ups and downs of the economy or their personal well being. 
If most Americans are individualistic and egalitarian, then the job replacement 
issue seems to be very much fueled by racial prejudice. 
The opinion of immigrants causing higher taxes shares the same pattern of 
correlation with individualism, egalitarianism and racism, but with additional 
influences from ideology and personal economic well being. Liberals object 
to the idea that Hispanic immigrants are tax burdens or welfare burdens. 
In addition, those who had worse personal financial situations tend to believe 
Asian immigrants caused higher taxes. So we see a difference of opinion on the 
issue of raising, depending on which immigrant group is in question. Hispanic 
immigrants seem to invoke a liberal-conservative feud on taxation for the poor, 
while Asian immigrants seem to remind people of economic competition. 
However, when asked for policy preference on decreased immigration, peo-
ple give interesting responses based on their evaluation of the economy. Those 
who think the national economy is going well are more likely to prefer decreased 
immigration. So are those who expect a better personal financial condition in 
the future. This suggests that many people think that a better economy in the 
future will probably attract more immigrants and thus stricter regulation is 
needed. It is also possible that these people thought the economy at the time 
was the worst and anything in the future would be better. They could have 
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preferred decreased immigration since they attributed part of the economic 
recession to the current immigration policy. 
The sense of interest conflict is also apparent on the opinion of welfare 
reform for immigrants. Those who expect to have worse personal :financial 
conditions in the future tend to prefer delayed welfare access for immigrants. 
So the opinion of this group of people is rather interesting - if I expect to do 
worse in the near future, I do not mind having more immigrants in this country 
but they had better not live on welfare. This attitude somewhat suggests that 
they want to use immigrants to boost the economy. 
On both policy preferences, belief variables have slightly different effects 
compared with those on the opinion of economic impact. Anti-minority affect 
jumps to a new high in predicting the preference for decreased immigration 
and delayed welfare policies. Individualism no longer has a significant effect 
on these opinions. Egalitarianism continues to show strong effects on oppos-
ing de.creased immigraticm and delayed welfare policies. It seems opinion on 
immigration reform can be very much determined by the relative strength of 
one's racial bigotry and belief in egalitarianism. 
To summarize, the :findings in this chapter generalize the results in the 
previous chapters. First, it establishes that what motivated the Californians 
to start the immigration reform in the 1990's is shared by most Americans 
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nationwide. Second, American identity does not result in anti-immigration 
sentiment, racism does. And third, interest calculation is more involved in 
policy suggestions that have direct economic consequences. 
In addition, the findings show that there was no uncertainty due to in-
formation shortage. Most of the survey respondents -had well-formed views 
on immigrants and immigration policies. This suggests that the immigration 
problem is not a new issue at all. The steady inflows of immigrants into this 
country have lasted for over a century now. Being the descendents of early 
generations of immigrations, most of the native residents are rather familiar 
with the consequences of immigration. Political campaigns may further polar-
ize the opinion on certain policies instead of educating individuals about the 
immigration issue in general. 
The absence of ambivalence also suggests that the effect of individualism 
on the issue of immigration is completely different from its effect on welfare 
policies. In other words, most of the native residents do not think of new 
immigrants as welfare recipients. Rather, a more individualistic person might 
feel closer to the spirit of new immigrants and would like to have more lib-
eral immigration policies. So most native residents in fact acknowledge the 
individualistic efforts by new immigrants. 
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5.6 The American Dilemma 
It seems that the traditional values passed down from early generations of 
immigrants are still shaping people's views on immigration issues nowadays. 
Both individualism and egalitarianism help Americans to justify the impact of 
immigrants. Egalitarianism in particular encourages more liberal immigration 
policies. That probably explains why a good portion of the time in history, 
the U .8. has acted with generosity to immigrants beyond what it conceived 
to be in its national self-interest, though many argue that its self-interest was 
thereby better served. 
Unfortunately, racial prejudice is almost inseparable from the evolution 
of the American belief system as well. What we see in this chapter is very 
intriguing- racial prejudice has direct influence on how native residents judge 
the economic impact of immigrants. In fact, the more negative stereotypes on 
minorities one has, the more likely one tends to see job replacement and higher 
taxes caused by immigrants. Though it seems logical to link "laziness" with 
higher taxes, presumably for welfare spending, it is really hard to explain how 
"laziness" or "unintelligence" could cause job replacement. 
It seems that once the disliking affect is developed, the impression is eas-
ily influenced. Driven by racial prejudice, one does not hesitate to give bad 
reviews of immigrants, despite apparent inconsistency. This case shows how 
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easily opinion on racially sensitive questions can be subject to racial prejudice. 
Notice that economic performance was almost completely disregarded in the 
forming of the judgment. 
The tradition of individualism and egalitarianism has conflicted with racial 
prejudice to give America a dilemma on immigration issues. On one hand, they 
believe in individualism and egalitarianism, the values that made this country 
one of the greatest in modern civilization. They believe in American Dreams, 
admiring those who came empty-handed and succeeded with individual effort. 
They believe that everyone should have equal opportunity to fulfill personal 
ambition on this land. Consequentially, they do not blame new immigrants 
for job replacement, and they have much faith that new immigrants are hard 
workers instead of tax burdens. 
On the other hand, racial bias is causing much resentment toward new 
immigrants. Either way new immigrants perform, racist lenses distort their 
achievement. If they do well, then they become job thieves. If they stay 
behind, they become tax burdens. So no matter what new immigrants do, they 
become a disturbance to native residents and are not welcome. Racism has 
offset much of the liberalism in immigration attitude that American identity 
has generated. 
Compared with symbolic racism, the way symbolic prejudice has operated 
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on nativism sentiment is quite different. Here the traditional values can not 
justify the "dislike" of new immigrants. Rather, traditional values work against 
racial prejudice to generate more positive views on immigrants and more sup-
port on liberal immigration policies. So the symbolic prejudice against new 
immigrants is of a simpler form than symbolic racism. It only contains anti-
minority affect. 
5. 7 The Rational Public 
An important discovery of the analysis in this chapter is that people reveal 
different ways of opinion formation on different types of questions. When 
asked about their impression on immigrants, the answers heavily rely upon 
subjective beliefs. While on questions regarding policy preference, rational 
calculations of economic performance come to share the reasoning. 
It seems important to distinguish the types of public opinion under study. 
If the opinion solicited is about the impressions or judgment of other people, it 
could show dominant influences from subjective idiosyncrasies such as values, 
beliefs, or prejudice. This suggests that inter-group perceptions are formed 
at a rather early stages of socialization and stay relatively unchanged, as the 
values and beliefs are. Positive or negative, these perceptions will be reflected 
accordingly on various issues, as in this case of immigrants' impact. 
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Yet, opinions on policy suggestions appear to have drawn more dimensions 
of consideration. Besides personal principles, the effects of such policies are 
not neglected. As discussed earlier, people either wanted to change the current 
immigration policy because they had suffered economic distress, or wanted 
to regulate potentially large inflow of immigrants brought by the expected 
booming of the economy in the near future. Thus, most of the public did 
engage in rational calculation of interests when presented with questions about 
potential actions. 
This calls for caution in public opinion study. While we have found eco-
nomic concerns to be of negligible influence on people's perception of the 
impact of immigrants, we can not conclude that interest conflict does not 
drive people's desire to change public policy. Public policy represents concrete 
changes of benefits and costs. Interesting enough, people are willing to think 
realistically and rationally when suggesting changes of public policy. 
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Chapter 6 
THE URBAN PERSPECTIVE 
Not to be neglected is the special case of urbanites. Most of the new 
immigrants have been urban-bound, making the country's top three cities -
New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago - the homes of over one third of the 
new immigrants. Compared with other native residents, urbanites are at the 
direct impact zone of new immigrants. They become neighbors, coworkers, 
fellow PTA members, or even political rivals of the new immigrants. Given 
their close interactions with new immigrants, they deserve a special place in 
this study. This chapter focuses on Los Angelenos' opinion on immigration 
issues. 
Los Angeles experienced a wave of new immigrants before the recurrence 
of nativism in the 1990s. It is also known for its diverse ethnicity. The rapid 
increase in non-Anglo immigrants in Los Angeles has created a new dynamic 
between different ethnic groups. Besides the traditional black-white conflict, 
the tensions between blacks and new immigrant groups have been mounting. 
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For example, in the 1992 Rodney King beating case, blacks could not tolerate 
the verdict by a white jury, but in the riot in protest of it, .the looters and 
the looted were mainly blacks, Hispanics and Asians in the inner city. Most 
of the Hispanics and Asians involved were new immigrants. So the case of Los 
Angele!? provides a window to the complex relations b~twee:ri new immigrants 
and different groups of native residents. 
6.1 The Immigrant Magnet 
According to 1990 census, in the city of Los Angeles, over 27% are foreign born; 
in the greater Los Angeles area, over 32% are foreign born. This is the highest 
rate among all major cities, except for Miami, which has a much smaller total 
population and where 34% are foreign born. Needless to say, a good portion 
of Angelenos are immigrants. Furthermore, most of these immigrants came in 
the recent· decad.es. 
In "Los Angeles and Its Immigrants," Roger Waldinger (1996) detailed 
L.A.'s history of being an immigrant magnet in recent decades. Though Los 
Angeles had been home to a substantial foreign-born population at the earlier 
part of the century, a steady inflow of domestic immigrants from the Midwest 
had kept the region's foreign-born population below 8% by 1960. Since late 
1960's, the foreign-born population in L.A. has increased rapidly. During 
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the 70's and 80's, Los Angeles was the nation's most intensive immigration 
focal point. Very large immigrant inflows, combined with net domestic out-
migration during the 1970s, and reduced domestic in-migration during the 
1980s, sharply boosted immigrant population shares: by 1990, immigrants 
comprised 273 of the region's population and 33 percent of those living in Los 
Angeles county. 
What distinguishes Los Angeles from New York, the other important stage 
station for immigrants, is the sudden increase in the number of immigrants in 
recent decades. New York has retained a very substantial foreign-born popula-
tion throughout the twentieth century; consequently, the very large immigrant 
inflows registered since the mid-1960's have had a more modest effect on the 
foreign-born share of the city's population. But L.A. really exceeded the oth-
ers as a magnet for the very recently arrived: the immigrant wave of the 1980's 
made up 13% of the region's population, as opposed to 4% for the U.S. as a 
whole. In 1996, L.A. was again the top metropolitan residence for immigrants, 
recording over 159,000 immigrants settling in the region. 
According to many scholars, new immigrants have brought L.A. cheap la-
borers who are indispensable to the region. For example, Simon (1989) showed 
that Mexican Americans arriving since the 1970's filled in the low-skilled, low-
paid jobs in Los Angeles. In comparison, employment of blacks in Los Angeles 
increased by 107,000 in the 70's, with 98,000 of these in white-collar occupa-
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tions. By contrast, Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles held 210,000 jobs in 
1980, but fewer than 25,000 of these were in white-collar employment. Even 
though the total number of jobs in the low-skilled occupational categories de-
clined at the time, the number of Mexican immigrants holding jobs in these 
occupations soared by 108,000. In addition, the rising job status of black 
women was especially noteworthy. In 1980, 7 out of 10 black women working 
in Los Angeles held white-collar jobs, the highest ratio in the nation. By con-
trast, only one out of every ten Mexican women immigrants was employed in a 
white-collar occupation. It is fair to say that the input of Mexican Americans 
as well as other new immigrants supplied the L.A. economy with much needed 
labor and helped it to boom for two decades. Meanwhile, new immigrants 
enjoyed a boost in their own living standards. Among Mexican Americans 
in L.A., the proportion with professional and managerial jobs almost doubled 
between 1970 and 1990 (Waldinger 1996). 
The success that some of the earlier immigrants achieved encouraged more 
immigrants to come to "gold paved" California, with or without the permis-
sion of the INS. The recession in early 1990's definitely decreased demand for 
migrant laborers. Thus, many of the newcomers entered the U.S. through the 
backdoor, and L.A. 's proximity to the border meant that it attracted far more 
than its share of unauthorized immigrants. 
Many native residents started to feel under siege by Spanish-speaking illegal 
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immigrants. The foundation of such perception was that L.A. did have an 
extraordinarily high volume of immigration from Mexico and Central America. 
Asians have moved to Los Angeles in substantial numbers, but their numbers 
remain dwarfed by the Mexican and Central American presence. Overall, ten 
countries, Mexico and nine other Central America Countries, 1 a~counted for 
70 percent of all of the region's foreign-born residents, an unusual pattern, 
since elsewhere, immigrant origins are far more scrambled (Waldinger 1996). 
The ten countries that dominate the fl.ow to LA account for only 40 percent of 
the immigrants living outside Los Angeles. Even an immigrant dense region 
like New York is far more in line with the overall national pattern than is Los 
Angeles. 
6.2 Next-Door Neighbors 
Besides the characteristics of attracting high volumes of Hispanic immigrants, 
. another feature deserves special emphasis - Los Angeles' "majority minori-
ties," who live in close proximity with new immigrants in the inner city, and 
who might have had unique opinions on the issue of immigration. 
Previous studies have provided mixed views on the effects of close proximity 
1The other nine countries are: El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Bahamas, Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic. 
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between different groups. Some studies suggest that an increase in inter-group 
contact tends to reduce inter-group conflict (Amir 1969, 1976; Hood and Morris 
1997; Jackman and Crane 1986; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Rothbart and 
John 1993; Stephan 1985). These works assume that inter-group antagonism 
· stems from "unrealistic negative expectations of one another" (Rothbart and 
John 1993, 43). By increasing contact with other groups, experience replaces 
expectations and the perceptions of the other group are modified based on 
favorable attitudes toward individual group members. In other words, if inter-
group conflict is caused by prejudice, then close proximity could bridge the 
gap between groups. 
Other studies have come to opposite conclusions. For example, V. 0. Key 
(1949) found that southern whites who lived in areas with high concentrations 
of blacks happened to show the most racially conservative attitudes. Many 
other studies concur that inter-group contact intensifies conflict (Giles 1977; 
Giles and Hertz 1994; Glasser 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995). The ra-
tionale behind this argument is that proximity results in more competition, 
which then breeds conflict. Not surprisingly, this resonates with the theory of 
realistic group conflict. 
My findings in previous chapters also reflect on the complexity of this 
problem. On one hand, I find close contact with minorities could reduce the 
support for Proposition 187, as happened in the Bay Area cities. On the other 
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hand, Los Angelenos did pass Proposition 187 and Los Angeles also has a high 
degree of multiculturalism. So what distinguished L.A.? As discussed above, 
one reason might be its sudden increase in Hispanic immigrants in the recent 
decades, a pattern unique among major American cities. The other reason 
might be its size. Los Angeles spreads out over 4000 ~quare miles and the real 
mixture between new immigrants and native residents might have happened 
in limited neighborhoods whose residents did not represent the overall racial 
composition of the greater L.A. area. In other words, racial minorities live 
close to new immigrants in L.A. while white natives do not necessarily live 
closer to new immigrants in L.A. than in other cities. 
So I would like to test how different ethnic groups in L.A. perceived the 
impact of the increasing Hispanic population. While the theories are pointing 
toward different possibilities, the evidence from the city politics at the time 
does not have consistent suggestions either. On one hand, there was indis-
putable ev'idence that native African Americans did not like new immigrants, 
symbolized by the 1992 Riot. On the other hand, minority native residents had 
more sympathetic views on illegal immigrants, as they objected to Proposition 
187 at a higher rate than whites a year later. So I do not have a hypothesis 
that predicts whether minorities would have more positive or negative views 
on the impact of new immigrants. 
The hypotheses I have are based upon the general patterns of opinion found 
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in previous chapters. I expect to see the presence of the dilemma caused by 
racial prejudice and American values. 
6.3 Data and Analysis 
Showing whether L.A. 's minority groups have different views on immigration 
issues is a difficult task due to the lack of data. First, in almost all sur-
veys, minority sample sizes tend to be too small to bear a separate analysis. 
Second, surveys at the local level are often about single issues, and rarely pro-
vide information on questions other than those the survey designers wanted 
to investigate. Fortunately this author discovered a survey conducted by col-
leagues at University of California, Los Angeles, who were interested in similar 
questions. Courtesy of the Institute of Social Science Research at UCLA, I 
obtained this Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS data) conducted in 
1993. 1993 is an important year for Los Angelenos. It was one year after the 
1992 Riot and one year before Proposition 187 appeared on the center stage 
of race relations. This data set may well reflect the uprising concerns about 
issues of immigration at the time. I conducted the following analysis with 
Michael Alvarez. 
The survey randomly selected 986 residents in Los Angeles county to inter-
view over the phone, out of which 359 were black, 168 were Hispanic, and 42 
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were Asian. Blacks were deliberately over-sampled. The dependent variables 
are a series of questions about the impact caused by Hispanics. Specifically, 
the first question asked whether "more good jobs for Hispanics means fewer 
good jobs for members of other groups" (Job Crowding). The second asked 
whether "the more influence Hispanics have in local politics, the less influ-
ence members of other groups will have in local politics" (Political Crowding). 
The third asked if "as more good housing and neighborhoods go to Hispanics, 
the fewer good houses and neighborhoods there will be for members of other 
groups" (Housing Crowding), and the fourth asked whether "many Hispanics 
have been trying to get ahead economically at the expense of members of other 
groups" (Economic Crowding). The fifth question is more about the opinion 
on Affirmative Action, which said "Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other mi-
norities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Hispanic should do 
the same without any special favors." Respondents answered each question 
with "strongly agree," "agree," "neither agree nor disagree," "disagree," or 
"strongly disagree," indicated by integers 1 through 5. 
We used the answers to these questions to measure the opinion on the 
increasing Hispanic population at the time. The survey was conducted one 
year before Proposition 187 came out, so we have a perfect chance to see what 
the public opinion was like before the issue of illegal immigrants became heavily 
politicized. Similar to the dependent variables in the previous chapter, the 
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responses here solicited public opinion on the impact of a group of newcomers. 
Prompted by the findings in the previous chapter, we use racial prejudice and 
American values to predict people's perception. 
The measurement of racial prejudice is constructed from the answer.s to sev-
eral relevant questions. Similar to the procedure described in the last chapter, 
we identified three questions tapping into racial stereotyping, then conducted 
a factor analysis, and then used the commonality score to build an index for 
racism. The three questions asked the respondent whether they agreed on the 
reasons provided to explain why Hispanics were relatively worse off economi-
cally. The reasons were "less inborn ability to learn," "lack motivation," and 
"not speaking standard English." For the purpose of presentation later, we 
recode the variable so that higher values indicate stronger racial prejudice. 
Due to data availability, the measurement of beliefs is only on egalitari-
anism. Three questions were relevant to this index, including a feeling about 
"social equality _between groups," and whether "more equality brings fewer 
problems," and how much one should "strive for social equality." A factor anal-
ysis was conducted to measure respondents' belief in egalitarianism. Higher 
values stand for stronger belief. As before, both scores on racism and egali-
tarianism were re-scaled to be between 0 and 1. 
To capture the hypothesized unique opinion by minorities, we use dummy 
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variables to indicate the respondent's ethnic identity. Namely, black, Asian, 
and Hispanic respondents could have different reactions to the dependent vari-
ables. As mentioned earlier, this data set provides a reasonably large of minor-
ity sample. The survey over-sampled blacks and has a total of 57% minorities, 
of which 36% are blacks, 17% of Hispanics and 4% Asians. 
Also included as an explanatory variable is the respondent's answer on 
whether his or her neighborhood had experienced an increase in Hispanic res-
idents. If so, a dummy variable is set to indicate such change. 
To control for other effects, we also included people's ideological standings. 
Dummy variables are used to indicate being liberal or conservative, with the 
baseline as ideologically moderate. Female respondents are also given a dummy 
variable, for possible gender gap in the opinion. 
What calls for more discussion is how we handled the missing data in this 
analysis. Due to the survey methodology, almost all questions about opinions 
were asked to only two-thirds of the whole sample, so we had a large num-
ber of missing data for racial stereotype and each of the dependent variables. 2 
We felt that the sample size would be too small to draw any inference if the 
missing data points were simply left out. So we used imputation to fill in the 
2For other independent variables, there are no systematic missing data. Questions re-
garding egalitarianism were asked to the whole sample. So were the other demographic 
variables. 
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missing data points for the variables of interest. 3 The criteria were mainly 
demographic information, including education level, gender, age, ethnicity, 
ideology, and partisanship. In addition, we also used the respondent's feel-
ings toward Hispanics and Hispanic civil rights organizations to impute racial 
stereotype and the dependent variables. For each dependent variable, we used 
the other dependent variables to help impute it as well. 
Of course, we tested whether the imputation would generate vastly different 
results compared with the original but smaller data set. We replicated the 
analysis without the imputed data. The results turned out to be essentially 
identical. Using the imputed data, the efficiency of the estimates improved, as 
expected with a larger data set. 
Figure 6.1 shows the distributions of the dependent variables. On the first 
4 questions, there were many fewer respondents who answered "disagree" or 
"strongly disagree." To avoid skewed tails, we combined the answers of "dis-
agree" and "strongly disagree" as one choice. So each dependent variable has 4 
ordered choices, from "strongly agree," "agree," "neither agree nor disagree," 
to "disagree," indicated with 1 to 4. On the question of special favors, we 
retained the 5 ordered responses. 
The histograms show that the opinion was definitely not positive on the 
3The imputation we used is filling in least squares estimates for missing data. Please see 
























Figure 6.1: Distribution of the Dependent Variable on Hispanics' Impact 
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impact of Hispanics. For comparison, we also graphed the same responses on 
the impact of blacks. If the two groups draw drastically different responses, 
then the opinion on Hispanics must have been influenced by something unique 
to Hispanics, possibly their close link to new immigrants. If they are roughly 
the same, then it suggests that such opinion were based on something common 
to both ethnic groups. As Figure 6.2 shows, the latter seems to be the case. 
The distribution of the opinion on blacks' impact looks very similar to that on 
Hispanics' impact. 
This finding suggests that a comparison across racial groups may reveal 
more on the motives. So we constructed the same kind of independent variables 
to explain the opinion on blacks' impact. Most of the independent variables 
are the same, except for the measurement of anti-Hispanic prejudice and the 
dummy variable indicating more Hispanics have moved to the respondent's 
neighborhood. Since the survey also asked corresponding questions about 
blacks, these two variables are constructed accordingly with the same kind of 
questions on blacks. 
Figure 6.3 summarizes the correlation between anti-Hispanic prejudice, 
anti- black prejudice, and egalitarianism. The 3 diagonal cells tell each cell's 
dimensions. For example, the middle cell of the first column graphs the obser-
vations of anti-Hispanic prejudice on the horizontal axis and anti-black prej-
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right-side three cells are the symmetric images of each other by the diagonal 
cells. 
It appears that anti-Hispanic prejudice and anti-black prejudice are not well 
correlated, meaning that people could have very different views on different 
minority groups. The correlation between racial prejudice and egalitarianism 
were rather loose too. This suggests that many Hispanics and blacks were 
probably having more negative reviews on each other, assuming that they had 
better reviews of their own groups. 
We employed ordered probit to study the different opinions, since the an-
swers were ordered choices. Four probit regressions are used to predict each of 
the five dependent variables for each ethnic group. The regressions estimate 
the thresholds between each ordered choices with all the independent variables 
discussed above. I expect racial prejudice and egalitarianism to have oppo-
site effects on the perception, with racial prejudice encouraging more negative 
views on each group. I have no a priori view on how minority opinions differ 
from Anglo opinions. 
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6.4 Mutual Feelings 
Table 6.1 provides the estimated coefficients and their standard errors for 
each independent variable. The estimated thresholds are indicated by µ1 to 
. µ 4 under the coefficients. Table 6.2 shows the corresponding findings of the 
same model applied to blacks. 
Let us look at the opinion on Hispanics first. Higher values of the de-
pendent variables indicate more positive views, such as, less likely to cause 
crowding in various aspects. Anti-Hispanic prejudice has negative signs across 
all questions, meaning that a more racist person is less likely to give positive 
views on the impact of Hispanics. Egalitarianism has positive effects on views, 
meaning that higher degrees of belief in egalitarianism tend to give more pos-
itive views on the impact of Hispanics. And just like the findings in the last 
chapter, both racial prejudice and egalitarianism are statistically significant 
and have· opposite effects on the opinion. 
On the four questions about Hispanics' effects on crowding the political 
and economic system, compared with white respondents, Hispanic respondents 
could not disagree more. Their answers have significantly higher probabilities 
of falling into the categories of giving positive views on the impact. Though 
this is not surprising, the answers given by blacks and Asians were very in-
teresting. Compared with whites, blacks were much more likely to think that 
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Table 6.1: Perceptions on Hispanic's Socioeconomic Impact 
Unlikely Chances of Hispanics Causing 
Independent No special Job Political .Housing Economic 
Variables favors crowding crowding crowding crowding 
Anti-Hispanic -.47* -1.1 ** -1.4** -1.3** -1.9** 
.30 .30 .30 .33 .31 
Egalitarianism .48** .58** .24** .67** .62** 
.21 .21 .21 .23 .21 
Females -.05 -.01 .01 -.01 -.11* 
.08 .08 .08 .09 .08 
Hispanics .12 .34** .51 ** .26** .21** 
.11 .11 .11 .12 .11 
Blacks .21** .04 .10 -.18** -.19** 
.08 .08 .09 .09 .09 
Asians .26* -.16 -.05 .37** -.06 
.18 .18 .18 .21 .18 
Liberals .20** .13* .08 .16* -.01 
.09 .09 .09 .10 .09 
Conservatives -.04 -.04 -.17* .09 -.03 
.10 .10 .10 .11 .10 
More Hispanics -.09 -.17** -.19** .02 -.05 
.08 .08 .08 .09 .08 
µ1 -2.1 -1.9 -2.0 -2.1 -2.4 
µ2 -.55 -.24 -.53 -1.4 -.90 
µ3 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.3 .95 
µ4 1.8 
Sample n 940 940 940 940 940 
x2 27.0** 48.0** 58.4** 46.2** 65.8** 
Note: *: p < .10, **:p < .05. 
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Hispanics caused crowded housing and achieved economic progress at the ex-
pense of others. They were slightly more likely to think that Hispanics did 
not cause job crowding and political crowding. Asians strongly disagreed with 
almost everyone that they believed Hispanics did not cause housing crowding 
at all. But they were slightly more likely to think that Hispanics caused job 
replacement, political and economic crowding. 
On the support for no special favors, most of the Hispanic respondents did 
not differ significantly with the white respondents, though Hispanics leaned 
towards allowing some special favors. But blacks and Asians definitely showed 
their strong support in keeping affirmative action. They both have significantly 
higher probability of disagreeing with no special favor for Hispanics. 
Female respondents have roughly the same opinion as males on all issues 
except one. They were more likely to think that Hispanics succeeded econom-
ically at the expense of other groups. 
Liberals in general gave more favorable answers. They also heavily favored 
allowing special favor for Hispanics. On the job crowding and housing crowd-
ing issues, they differed significantly with ideologically moderate respondents. 
Conservatives did the opposite. They particularly thought that Hispanics 
over-influenced local politics. 
Whether more Hispanics had recently moved into the respondent's neigh-
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borhood had significant influence on his opinion on job replacement and local 
politics issues. Interesting enough, it does not make the opinion on housing 
crowding any more negative. 
Looking at each issue, it seems that besides the consistent influence from 
racial prejudice and egalitarianism, some other factors may be particularly 
relevant. On job replacement issue, having more Hispanics moving into the 
respondent's neighborhood definitely made her more likely to worry about 
good jobs going to Hispanics. More Hispanics in the neighborhood had a 
similar effect on the political crowding problem. But conservatives definitely 
worried more about Hispanic power in politics. Housing seems to only concern 
blacks, though highly. Blacks were also the only group that complained of 
Hispanics stepping on other groups to achieve economic progress. 
Now turn to Table 6.2. The first difference comes from the opinion on no 
special favors for blacks. Compared with Table 6.1, a conspicuous change is 
that the other minorities did not side with the group in question. Compared 
with whites, both Hispanics and Asians were even more likely to agree that 
no special favor should be given to blacks. Also, the gap between liberals and 
conservatives on the issue was more polarized than on the Hispanic case. 
Anti-Black prejudice and egalitarianism have similar effects on opinions as 
in the case of Hispanics. The major difference is the effect of having more 
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Table 6.2: Perceptions on Black's Socioeconomic Impact 
Unlikely Chances of Blacks Causing 
Independent · No special . Job Political Housing Economic 
Variables favors crowding crowding crowding crowding 
Anti-Black -1.6** -2.0** -1.6** -2.1 ** -2.1 ** 
.29 .31 .31 .32 .29 
Egalitarianism .34** .69** .72** .79** .49** 
.20 .22 .22 .23 .21 
Females .15** .03 -.01 -.02 .06 
.08 .09 .09 .09 .08 
Hispanics -.10 -.05 -.12 -.18* -.15* 
.10 .11 .11 .11 .11 
Blacks .37** .30** .50** .34** .52** 
.08 .09 .09 .10 .09 
Asians -.25* -.12 -.01 -.04 -.21 
.18 .19 .20 .20 .18 
Liberals .24** .05 .17** .08 .14* 
.09 .09 .09 .10 .09 
Conservatives -.21 ** .10 -.08 -.05 .10 
.10 .11 .11 .11 .10 
More Blacks -.01 .07 -.18 .10 .05 
.15 .17 .16 .17 .15 
µ1 -2.2 -2.3 -2.1 -2.5 -2.1 
µ2 -.96 -1.5 -1.2 -1.6 -.76 
µ3 .84 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.3 
µ4 1.5 
Sample n 940 940 940 940 940 
x2 116.1 ** 84.7** 109.2** 105.6** 142.4** 
Note: * : p < .10, p < .05. 
173 
blacks moving into the neighborhood. Unlike the case of Hispanics moving 
in, blacks did not cause their new neighbors to think that blacks would cause 
more job replacement and influence local politics. This may have reflected 
relatively slow social mobility of blacks. 
Hispanics' opinions on housing and economic crowding by blacks comple-
ment the findings in Table 6.1. Compared with other groups, Hispanics were 
the only ones to give significantly more negative views on these issues. This 
confirms that housing competition is mainly between Hispanics and blacks 
who must have been more likely to live in the same communities. And such 
close proximity has also made them each think that the other was stepping on 
them to move up. 
However, the overwhelming effects were still from racism and egalitarian-
ism, since the two variables have much larger effects. Figure 6.3 and 6.4 depict 
the change of probabilities by each variable on each group. 
The vertical axis in each graph stands for the probability of the dependent 
variable. The horizontal axis shows the value of an independent variable. 
By holding all the other independent variables at the mean value, we let the 
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the upper graph of Figure 6.4, we can compare the relative attitude across 
different questions on Hispanics' impact. The question of job replacement by 
Hispanics consistently attracted more negative answers than other questions. 
Housing crowding was the least negative. Political crowding and economic 
crowdi_n.g were in between, but were more sensitive_ to tlie change in anti-
Hispanic prejudice. 
The lower graph plots the same kind of change in answers by an indepen-
dent variable, the anti-black prejudice. Apparently more people believed that 
blacks advanced economically at the expense of other groups. All of the other 
questions had similar distributions of answers. 
Figure 6.5 shows the estimated influence of egalitarianism. The upper 
graph is the impact of egalitarianism on attitudes about Hispanics and the 
lower is on attitudes about blacks~ Apparently egalitarianism had opposite 
effects compared with racial prejudice since now the changes of probabilities 
are going upwards. But the relatively flat lines indicate that the influence 
of egalitarianism was not as strong as racial prejudice. Furthermore, each 
question had roughly the same degree of sensitivity toward the change in 
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To summarize, the opinions studied here were subject to strong influence 
from racial prejudice and egalitarianism. The two factors had opposite influ-
ence and racial prejudice had larger magnitude of effects. Each ethnic group 
gave themselves a more positive view on the impact generated by its socioeco-
nomic progress. Hispanics and blacks were in competition for good housing, 
and blamed each other for progressing at the expense of the others. The 
increases in Hispanic neighbors resulted in more negative opinion on job com-
petition and influence in local politics by Hispanics. 
6.5 Personal Competition, Group Alliances 
The conflicting influence of racism and egalitarianism confirms the dilemma 
found in Chapter 5. It tells us how much one relies upon her sense of like 
or dislike and the sense of right or wrong to form opinions. But people are 
also responsive toward change in the environment. If one sees more Hispanics 
moving in to become neighbors, she tends to believe that Hispanics cause job 
competition and sway the local politics. 
But who are the people that are more likely to become neighbors with 
Hispanics? Most likely blacks. They complain that the housing supply is cut 
short by Hispanics, and believe Hispanics are stepping on others to move up 
economically. But compared with other groups, the majority of the blacks 
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actually sided with Hispanics on supporting more liberal immigration policies. 
Both the NAACP and the ACLU advocated the rejection of Proposition 187. 
This seems to be another case where political attitudes and policy prefer-
ences deviate from each other. Apparently blacks' attitudes toward-Hispanics 
were quite negative; blaming them for unfair competition in social upward 
mobility. But their policy preference went the other way. They supported the 
policy of aiding Hispanics with special favors. They did not support Propo-
sition 187, a law designed to contain the growing power of Hispanics. One 
probable answer is that blacks had a strategic interest in keeping the alliance 
with Hispanics to fight with white racists. Political commentators offer sup-
porting views on this argument. Edward Litwak pointed out in 1992 that 
"[f]rom Jesse Jackson on down, wider political ambitions induce black leaders 
to betray the uppermost interests of their poorest followers in order to coalesce 
with Hispanic groups that oppose all serious efforts to contain immigration." 4 
Such. "betrayal" did not happen without objection. As the exit poll in 
·Chapter 3 showed, almost 44 % of black voters in California supported Propo-
sition 187. The concern over direct economic competition is only growing, as 
we see more black leaders coming out to argue against the strategic alliance 
with Hispanics. In a 1997 rally, Jesse Peterson of Brotherhood Organization of 
4From "The Riots: Underclass vs. Immigrants," by Edward Litwak, New York Times, 
May 15, 1992. 
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a New Destiny reminded that "[i]mmigration, both legal and illegal, is having 
a major impact on the Black community. '!'hey are very unhappy about it . 
... Jesse Jackson, Maxine Waters, Louis Farrakhan, and others, have told the 
Black community this is a racial issue and it's not. It's an American issue." 5 
The phrase "an American issue" is changing the whole dividing line. It 
tends to replace the racial overtones of the immigration issue with the sense 
of American citizenship. Yet this will not happen, as long as the gap between 
whites and blacks is still wide enough to keep America divided. 
5From "The Next Big Divide?" by Ramesh Ratnesar, Time Magazine, December 1, 1997. 
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Chapter 7 
PERSONAL PREJUDICE AND INTEREST 
CALCULATION IN OPINION FORMATION 
As a nation of immigrants, the United States has welcomed immigrants in 
periods of expansion and optimism, and reviled them in periods of stagnation 
and cynicism - a cycle of nativism that has not stopped. A thorough exami-
nation of public opinion on immigrants and immigration policies in the 1990's 
reveals that ethnic prejudice has produced much of the fear and loathing of 
foreigners. The yearning for social homogeneity finds an internal enemy to sus-
tain it~elf: the "alien." Nativism has reflected one of America's basic divisions: 
race. 
Yet the United States is also the land of the the "American Dream." It 
is against the traditional American values to deprive newcomers equal oppor-
tunities to succeed with an honest effort. In fact, the traditional values were 
largely the legacy of immigrants' endeavors generations ago - individualistic 
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effort and equal opportunities. As long as new immigrants are following the 
footsteps of the old generations of immigrants, Americans can hardly deny 
their input to this country. Egalitarian and individualistic beliefs uphold the 
nation's faith in immigrants and immigration. 
The opposite effects of racial prejudice and tradit!onal values accompany 
the swing in public opinion on immigrants and immigration policies. With the 
increase of non-Anglo population in the country, racial prejudice inevitably 
widens the gap between native residents and new immigrations with negative 
stereotypes and expectations. But as most of the new immigrants successfully 
establish themselves, the traditional American values prevent native residents 
from being blind on the newcomers' effort and contributions. As long as both 
racial prejudice and American core values exist, Americans face a dilemma on 
immigration policy. Recognizing the internal conflict, one author puts it this 
way: "American nativism has had less to do with 'them' than us." 1 
In the middle of the conflicting values and prejudice, people are also highly 
rational when it comes to making public policies that will have concrete influ-
ence on their economic well being. Though preferences on immigration policies 
reflect individual's attitude toward immigrants, the two are not equivalent. 
Policy preferences invoke interest calculations in addition to the emotion of 
1 By "immigration Facts" James Crawford, delivered at the National Immigration Forum, 
1997. 
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whether one likes those foreign-looking new immigrants. The performance of 
the national economy and personal pocketbook become an important dimen-
sion in making the choices. 
In addition to such concrete interest, the choices .made by most African-
Americans on immigration policies reflect a calculated interest that is long-
term and for the whole racial group. As the socioeconomic lower class, blacks 
are in direct competition with new immigrants for jobs, housing, education, 
and local political power. Compared with whites, they have more negative 
attitudes toward Hispanics. Yet they are more sympathetic to Hispanics' fight 
for more liberal immigration policies. In fact, they are in alliance with His-
panics on the immigration issue in order to have Hispanics as their partners 
on other racial issues. Their top interest of fighting against white racism has 
motivated them to take such a stand on immigration policies. 
More important, when people are weighing their interest to form their pol-
icy preferences, various factors are involved in the process of assessing the 
realistic interest. Proximity is an important one. Lack of contact makes the 
decision making process rely more on subjective expectations instead of up-
dated experience. In this case, personal prejudice could disproportionately 
influence the decision making process by filtering in the information that is 
consistent with the prejudice. As perceived threat becomes "realistic" threat, 
the interest motivation bears a deep mark of personal idiosyncrasies. 
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This picture of opinion formation synthesizes the theories of interest poli-
tics and symbolic politics. It first points out that different types of questions 
invoke different aspects of concern. In addition, it explains how hard it is to 
disentangle the effects of prejudice from the measurement of realistic interest. 
Furthermore, it calls for analysis that treats interest politics and symbolic pol-
itics as complements, rather than rivals, of each other. With the improvement 
in the field of methodology, more sophisticated models may be able to reveal 
the process of prejudice and interest conflict interacting with each other to 
form perceptions. 
This thesis intends to contribute to improving inter-group relations. My 
findings suggest that ethnic aggregation and economic equalization are the key 
factors in bridging the various groups. In a sense, both prejudice and interest 
conflict are inevitable in human society. However, aggregation can increase 
information exchange between groups and reduce the influence of outdated 
ste~eotypes. The vote outcome on Proposition 187 in the San Francisco Bay 
Area is a good example of how close contact reduced ethnic gap. Of course, 
close proximity alone can not accomplish anything. Without leveling the eco-
nomic progress between groups, interest calculation can always be the cause 
of division, as truthfully projected in the black-white paradigm in the United 
States. 
The President's call for a dialogue between racial groups in this country 
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is certainly a constructive measure toward eliminating prejudice. Let people 
get to kn.ow the majority members of other groups, and not settle for partial 
images. But equally important is to advance the economic status of minority 
groups. With or without the Affirmative Action programs, any policy that 
encourages the underprivileged groups to get ahead is a valuable _contribution 
to better race relations. 
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Appendix A Merger of Precincts to 
Census Geography 
The Institution of Government Studies provides the following documentation 
on the procedure of merging precincts to census geography. 
1. Geocoding of Registered Voter files. 
All registered voter files are geocoded against the TIGER files. As geocod-
ing puts the census geo&raphy on an individual address and this address also 
has a registration precinct on it, this allows the creation of a registration 
precinct to census geography equivalency file. If every address on the regis-
tered voter file could be placed in census geography, then a complete equiva-
lency table could be built up. Unfortunately, this is not possible. Thus, two 
further steps are necessary. 
2. Geographical Representations of Registration Precincts. 
The other method of obtaining precinct to census equivalencies is through 
mapping the registration precincts onto the census geography directly. One can 
186 
always (assuming one has the precinct maps) create an equivalency this way. 
For the 1992 General elections, the geographical mapping program utilized 
required the use of whole blocks in making assignments to the precincts. 
3. Assignment of blocks to Registration Precincts. 
This allows the assigning of blocks to precincts independent of TIGER · 
or geographical representation, and is useful primarily when the geographical 
representation (which was required to follow block boundaries) is not an ac-
curate representation of the actual boundaries. This split is then handled by 
a statistical assignment procedure (see below). 
4. Balancing (assignment of split census blocks). 
The primary difficulty is when a precinct splits a census block into two or 
more sections, as it is then indeterminate how many registered voters live in 
each section. This can be handled either by geographical estimation or statis-
tical estimation (statistical is used in this process). The statistical procedure 
is designed to allocate registered voters which have been left unassigned to 
census geography by geo-coding the blocks in such a manner as to equate ex-
pected registration with actual registration (the expected registration is also 
an estimate). This problem is formulated as a linear programming problem 
and is run through multiple iterations to achieve the final result. 
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5. Merger of Registration data to Census Geography. 
The <tt>RB##AD%%.TYR</tt> file is a precinct to block conversion 
file constructed by the methods described in 1, 2, 3 and 4. The precincts here 
are RR type precincts. For registered voters assigned to a particular block 
through geocoding, the -derived registration data is assigned directly to that 
block. 
For registered voters assigned through the balancing procedure, a straight 
breakdown of the derived registration data proportional to the number of 
registered voters assigned through the balancing procedure is made. This 
algorithm could be improved upon by conditioning on the characteristics of 
the individuals in that block. 
6. Merger of Statement of Vote Data to Census Geography. 
The RB##AD%%.TYR files are merged to the level of the final consoli-
dation precincts· using the SR##AD%%.TYR file. SOY data is then merged 
to block using this merged file. A straight proportional merge is made using 
as a breakdown the proportion of voters assigned to each block. Note that a 
more accurate methodology would be to calculate the estimated proportion of 
each type of voter in each block voting for a particular race and adjusting by 
this percent. 
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The calculation of these proportions is a difficult theoretical problem which 
we believe we have solved, but this solution, if indeed it is a solution, has not 
been tested at the level necessary to implement it. 
Absentee pr~cincts are not in general merged to the block level unless the 
absentee precinct results are reported at the level of the registration precinct 
(counties such as San Francisco and Monterey are reported that way, for ex-
ample). Thus, areas (primarily in rural, sparsely populated areas) where the 
election results are collapsed into a larger absentee precinct (usually at the 
level of the ballot group) will not have any election results reported for them. 
The number of these areas is relatively small. 
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